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1. Abstract 
This thesis investigates initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the 
years 2009-2014. The analysis focuses on the short-term aftermarket performance, and how 
this may be affected by the initial demand for the issue and the pricing of the IPO relative to 
a set of comparable companies.  
I found the average abnormal returns for the IPOs in the years 2009-2014 to be negative for 
first day, week and month. The returns aggravated with the time horizon, indicating that the 
markets require more than one day to eliminate mispricing of IPOs. These results stand out 
compared to prior research, as fundamental underpricing of IPOs has been considered an 
established fact on theoretical ground. Assuming the same theories to hold, the apparent 
persistent overpricing of Norwegian IPOs may entail challenges for companies considering 
going public.   
To reflect the initial demand I examined two proxies, namely the placement of the final offer 
price relative to the indicative price range and the level of oversubscription at the final offer 
price. The Norwegian IPOs appeared to have strong skewness towards the left of the price 
range midpoint, and the oversubscription levels came out lower than for international 
studies. However, both proxies proved strong indicators of aftermarket performance, as the 
IPOs with high initial demand outperformed the IPOs with low initial demand.  
The relative peer pricing aspect was reflected through the valuation multiples P/E and 
EV/EBITDA. For both multiples I found significant underpricing of the IPO companies 
relative to listed peers. Once again, this contradicts prior research, which has justified higher 
valuation of IPO companies on the basis of higher growth rates than their mature peers. In 
accordance with the asymmetric information theory regarding IPO pricing, the IPO 
companies which were priced cheap relative to peers significantly outperformed the IPO 
companies which were priced rich relative to peers. It is interesting to observe that although 
the IPO companies on average were underpriced relative to peers, they underperformed the 
general market in the time after listing.  
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3. Introduction 
3.1 Background 
During the past decade, a large number of initial public offerings have taken place on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. From the year 2005 and up to the financial crisis in 2008, 96 new 
companies were listed on either Oslo Børs or Oslo Axess. The crisis reminded investors that 
risk capital was, indeed, risky, and capital fled the markets. The IPO activity recovered 
slowly after the financial turbulence, and only 2 listings were successfully executed in 
Norway in 2009. However, as the markets shook off the fear and new risk capital was ready 
to enter the markets, we have seen 49 new listings in the years 2009 and up to today.  
In international finance literature extensive research has been done on the nature of initial 
public offerings and their market adjusted performance after listing. Historically one has 
observed great abnormal initial returns of subscribing to IPOs. As this appears to be “money 
left on the table”, numerous attempts have been made to explain and rationalise this 
fundamental underpricing. However, there are few empirical studies on this topic regarding 
the Norwegian IPO market, which has been the motivation behind my thesis.  
3.2 Research questions 
I will analyse the aftermarket performance of the initial public offerings that have been 
executed on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 2009 and up to October 2014. This will include 
listings both on the main list, Oslo Børs, and the alternative listing option, Oslo Axess. 
Through econometric modelling I will examine the relationship between certain predicators 
and the aftermarket performance.  
The thesis can be seen as a two-part analysis. The first part addresses how the initial demand 
for the issue may affect the pricing of the IPO and the aftermarket performance. To 
investigate the significance of the initial demand I will consider two potential independent 
variables. The first variable relates to where the final offer price is set relative to the 
indicative price range disclosed in the prospectus. A high demand of issue shares during the 
bookbuilding period is assumed to result in an upward revision of the final offer price. As 
high initial demand is expected to positively correlate with aftermarket performance, 
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offerings going public above the midpoint of the price range should outperform the ones 
going public with an offer price below midpoint. The second variable relates to the 
oversubscription to the issue and how this may affect the aftermarket performance. A high 
demand of issue shares relative to the shares available will result in investors receiving 
insufficient allocations. This may in turn lead investors with insufficient allocations to 
acquire shares in the aftermarket. Thus, a higher level of oversubscription should imply a 
better aftermarket performance. 
The second part of the thesis addresses the pricing of the IPO relative to comparable 
companies, and how this in turn may affect the aftermarket performance. The relative pricing 
will be determined through financial multiples, and compared to the average multiples of a 
relevant peer group. The average valuation of the peer group will define the “fair value” of 
the IPO company. The asymmetric information theory of IPO pricing suggests that the 
efficient markets will eliminate any mispricing immediately. Hence, IPO companies which 
are priced cheap relative to peers should outperform those who are priced rich relative to 
peers.  
While there are numerous studies separately examining the two abovementioned factors’ 
impact on the aftermarket performance, I have not been able to obtain any studies examining 
both factors collectively. Hence, I am of the opinion that an analysis including both factors 
may provide a more comprehensive overview of the aftermarket performance of IPOs. 
The hypotheses I will examine are therefore: 
1) The higher the initial demand for the issue, the higher are the abnormal returns in 
the aftermarket 
2) The lower the IPO company is priced relative to peers, the higher are the abnormal 
returns in the aftermarket 
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4. Theory 
4.1 Initial public offering 
An initial public offering (IPO) is the first time a company sells shares to the public. The 
company will hire an investment bank to determine the offer price and perform the 
marketing towards potential investors and execute the sale of the new shares. As the 
company goes from having exclusively private shareholders to trade their shares over the 
stock exchange, the IPO is commonly referred to as “going public”. Now the company must 
comply with a new set of rules and regulations regarding disclosure of information, financial 
reporting and the like. The company’s behaviour will be overseen by governing agencies, 
and any actions (or lack of actions) contrary to the regulations will be reported and 
potentially prosecuted.  
A company considering an IPO should weigh the benefits against the disadvantages. One 
significant, and probably the most compelling benefit of going public, is the access to a large 
and liquid capital market. Young growth companies in need of funding to further expand its 
business can entice the investors with shares on a highly liquid market place in return for 
fresh capital for the firm. In addition, the listing of the company’s shares might raise 
awareness of the firm, making it more attractive for potential customers and investors. On 
the negative side, the company will experience direct costs of being a public company, 
related to financial documentation, accounting fees, investor relations departments and so on. 
In addition, many would argue that the public investors are more short-sighted than private 
investors, forcing the management to focus on short-term profitability. This may negatively 
affect the long-term performance. (James & Fawcett, 2006) 
4.2 Book building vs. fixed price 
Companies that seek to list their shares will generally either choose the strategy of fixed 
price or book building. In the fixed price strategy, the advisors of the company establish the 
final offer price without first formally examining external perceptions of the company value. 
Naturally, the advisors may in advance conduct noncommittal valuation surveys among 
investors, however, this process is not formalized through a bidding process. Establishing an 
offer price in this situation, where investors are not forced to reveal their price perception, 
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will be a process of weighing the benefits of raising the price against the increased likelihood 
that the issue will not sell. (Benveniste & Busaba, 1997) 
The other, and in later years more common strategy for pricing an issue, is the book building 
method. The advisor conducts a pre-offer marketing effort, which provides non-binding 
indications of interest from the investor community. Together with the advisor’s internal 
valuation of the company, these indications help to set the indicative price range, which 
faces the investors during the book building period. Throughout this period the underwriter 
receive bids which are used to “build the book” (Jenkinson & Jones, 2002). The underwriters 
decide allocations based on a tiering-system with different levels of preferential interest, 
based on the quality of the investor, the trustworthiness of the information they reveal and to 
what extent the investor is a “repeat bidder” in numerous offerings. The benefit of the 
formalization of the information process vis-á-vis fixed price surveys is that investors are 
forced to reveal their identity, making it possible for the book runner to make allocations on 
a discretionary basis (Jenkinson & Jones, 2002). However, the potential downside is the risk 
of investors providing untruthful indications, as they know their input may affect the setup of 
the price range. The underwriters address this issue by giving truthful and trustworthy 
investors better “tiering” and hence potentially a more comprehensive allocation, in both the 
current and future issues. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) found that repeat bidders generally 
were favoured in the allocation process, and that the final price often was set close to the 
limit orders provided by large and high-quality investors. Hanley (1993) also found that 
truthful revelation of credible information is rewarded by an increase in share allocation.  
4.3 Abnormal rate of return 
In order to investigate how the aftermarket performance is affected by the factors mentioned 
in the abstract, it is important to define the measurement of performance. Abnormal rate of 
return, also known as alpha, excess return or market adjusted return, is a common measure 
in this regard. The abnormal return reflects the return of the stock or asset that is not 
explained by general movements in the market portfolio. This way the returns can be 
compared regardless of point in time. In financial theory the abnormal return is often 
estimated based on the CAPM model as:  
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 𝑟𝑖 − [𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓)] 
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where 𝑟𝑖 is the return of the stock of interest, 𝑟𝑚 is the return of the market portfolio, 𝑟𝑓 is the 
risk-free rate and 𝛽𝑖 is the beta of the stock of interest. However, for empirical studies one 
will apply the actual observed differences between the performance of the stock of interest 
and the market portfolio. The calculation of the abnormal return will be calculated as: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =
𝑝1 − 𝑝0
𝑝0
−
𝑚 − 𝑚0
𝑚0
 
where 𝑝1 is the price of the relevant stock at close of the first day (or 1st week/1st month), 
while 𝑝0 is the final offer price. 𝑚1is the value of the market index at close of the first day 
(or 1st week/1st month) the stock has been listed, and  𝑚0 is the value of the index at closing 
the day before listing. As the CAPM model is a theoretical approximation to reality, the use 
of actual observed differences in performance eliminates the potential source of error related 
to estimating the CAPM based abnormal returns.  
A benchmark or reference index is necessary in order to calculate the abnormal returns. The 
purpose of this index is to reflect the alternative investment opportunities the investors face. 
One could argue that a narrow sector index or the returns for a group of comparable 
companies could function as a reference index. However, the investment universe for the 
investors is not limited to one single sector, and hence the alternative investment universe 
should not be either. Thus, one should apply the same reference index for all companies. The 
IPO companies will come in all shapes and sizes, with different risk profiles and maturity. 
To catch this great variety in characteristics, a broad index will be ideal. I will return to the 
selection of the appropriate reference index in the methodology section.  
4.4 Relevant listing indeces 
When companies apply for listing in Norway, this can be done either on Oslo Børs or Oslo 
Axess. While an Oslo Børs-listing will be a full stock exchange listing, complying with all 
EU requirements, an Oslo Axess listing will be a listing to a fully regulated and authorised 
market place, although with fewer regulative demands. The requirements for Oslo Børs are 
more detailed and extensive than for Oslo Axess, e.g. with regards to the number of 
shareholders, disclosure of sensitive information and the like. While Oslo Børs is the most 
relevant alternative for mature companies with a long history, Oslo Axess is suitable for 
companies in a pre-commercial phase seeking the benefits of being listed on a regulated 
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market place (Børs, n.d.). This thesis will include the listings on both of these two market 
places.  
4.5 Relative pricing based on financial multiples 
In the process of explaining a mismatch between a company’s performance and those of its 
competitors, a multiple comparison within the relevant sector can be a helpful tool. Koller et 
al. (2010) point out that one should be careful to apply an average multiple for a peer group 
as comparative basis, as this might ignore important differences in return on invested capital 
(ROIC). However, the application of peer group averages is a recognized and common 
procedure among practitioners. As this is the type of analysis the investor community are 
presented with and relies on, it also becomes the most relevant method for practical 
considerations. Technical limitations with regards to the regression analysis also make the 
peer group average comparison the only feasible approximation.  
One should apply forward-looking multiples in a peer group analysis. This is consistent with 
general principle of valuation, as the company’s net worth equals the present value of future 
cash flows, rather than sunk costs. In addition, forward-looking projections are usually 
normalized, ignoring large one-offs that can have substantial effect on prior performance 
(Koller, et al., 2010). Companies going through an IPO process often have negative earnings 
due to high costs of growth and expansion. This makes it increasingly important to focus on 
future, rather than historical, profitability. 
When investigating the relative pricing, it is all about choosing the right multiples. One 
alternative would be to average several multiples in order to obtain one measurement of the 
relative pricing. However, Damodaran (2003) argues that averaging more than one multiple 
is “… completely inappropriate since it averages good estimates with poor ones equally”. He 
argues that if one or few multiples are chosen based on a thorough consideration, these will 
separately facilitate the best analysis.  
For the regression analysis the EV/EBITDA multiple (enterprise value divided by earnings 
before interest taxes, depreciation and amortization) and P/E (share price divided by earnings 
per share) will represent the relative pricing aspect. The EV/EBITDA multiple is ideal for 
companies in early stage, with high growth and negligible or negative net income, where 
earnings can depend heavily on the depreciation method (Damodaran, 2003). The remaining 
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economic lifetime of operational assets may also be a source of difference in profitability. 
Old assets often appear highly profitable as aggressive depreciation profiles lead to low 
depreciation in late years. However, as this difference is also connected to the depreciation, 
one will avoid the issue by applying an EBITDA based multiple. The rationale behind 
applying a multiple based on enterprise value is that such a multiple measures the unlevered 
value of the company, thus making the multiple unaffected by differences in capital structure 
among the peers. (Suozzo, et al., 2001). The EV/EBITDA is the most popular enterprise 
value multiple among practitioners, as it ignores both differences in depreciation policy and 
capital structure. In other words, it gives the “cleanest” perspective on the core operational 
profitability of the firm (Suozzo, et al., 2001). One could argue that the EV/EBIT multiple 
would be closer to a free cash flow multiple, as it takes into account the capital expenditures 
related to depreciation and amortization. However, for these early-stage companies, we 
might observe positive EBITDA at the same time as the EBIT is negative. As negative 
multiples are meaningless, choosing the EV/EBITDA multiple may increase the number of 
data points. 
I will also apply the P/E multiple in my analysis. This is simply because of the broad 
acceptance and reliance on this multiple among investors. The P/E multiple is, due to both 
historical and practical reasons, by far the most popular valuation multiple, and the relevance 
of this multiple is therefore hard to ignore. There are many reasons to argue why the P/E 
multiple is not necessarily theoretically the most appropriate multiple for valuation purposes, 
and some of these reasons are listed as benefits of the EV/EBITDA multiple in the paragraph 
above. Despite this, it has its clear benefits. As the new listings on OSE have a wide spectre 
of characteristics, it would be hard to find “the one right” multiple for all of them. For 
example, one could argue that the P/NAV (market value of equity divided by the net asset 
value) would be appropriate for shipping companies, but not at all be appropriate for 
companies that heavily rely on human capital. Therefore, my objective will be to find the 
multiples that will have the broadest catchment. In this “competition” the P/E multiple has a 
large utility value.  
4.6 IPO underpricing 
Fundamental underpricing of IPOs is an area of extensive research and clearly related to 
what I try to investigate in this thesis. Theoretically, the underpricing is most often 
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calculated as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price divided by 
the offer price (also referred to as initial return) (Georgieva, 2011). IPOs have a history of 
high positive abnormal initial returns, and in order to explain this (what appears to be) easy 
money, a number of explanations have been suggested. One popular explanation is the 
winner’s curse caused by asymmetric information between informed and uninformed 
investors. As informed investors are assumed to have access to all necessary information to 
determine the fair value of the firm, they will only subscribe to the underpriced IPOs. Due to 
asymmetric information, one further assumes the uninformed investors to subscribe to all 
issues indiscriminately, both overpriced and underpriced. Consequently, uninformed 
investors will only receive full allocation in the overpriced IPOs. If the uninformed investors 
on average lose money of subscribing to IPOs, they will shy away from the issue market. 
However, as informed investors alone not are able to absorb the issues, uninformed investors 
are needed in order to attain full subscription. Thus, the issues on average need to be 
underpriced (Georgieva, 2011). The second explanation suggests that because of asymmetric 
information high quality firms will underprice their IPO in order to signal their strength. This 
explanation suggests that the high quality companies signal that they can bear the costs of 
underpricing in order to be able to attract more investors in the future and consequently raise 
capital on better terms later. A third explanation suggests that the issuing company 
underprices their IPO simply to avoid lawsuits from unsatisfied investors, as these lawsuits 
will be less likely if the IPO turns out to be underpriced (Yong & Isa, 2003). A fourth 
explanation focuses on the underwriters’ role in the process. While the underwriter will 
receive goodwill from regular trading clients if the IPO is underpriced, the underwriter will 
also lose reputation as a reliable counterpart for the issuing company if the IPO is too heavily 
underpriced. Hence, the underwriter will choose a level of underpricing that satisfies the 
traders, at the same time not so significantly underpriced that they run the risk of losing 
reputation and possibly market share in the IPO market (Georgieva, 2011). As Georgieva 
also points out, the underpricing phenomenon differs substantially between different 
countries. Table 10-1 in Appendix 10.1 illustrates that the Norwegian IPO market 
historically has had low abnormal returns compared to other countries. One may argue that 
this may be due to differences in the characteristics and growth expectations of the 
companies being listed in Norway relative to other countries, however, I have found no 
research to back up that assertion.  
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4.7 Econometric analysis 
4.7.1 Characteristics of the data sample 
To analyse the aspects described in the introduction I will have to apply an econometric 
model. Intuitively, our data sample might appear to be cross-sectional data, as we have a 
random collection of different companies going through the IPO process. However, an 
assumption for cross-sectional data is that the data is collected at the same point of time. The 
IPOs in our sample happened over a period of five years, and hence we have a modified 
version of cross-sectional data, called pooled cross-sectional data. For practical purposes, the 
pooled cross-sectional data will be analysed much in the same way as regular cross-sectional 
data, although it is important to be aware of secular differences that might occur across time 
for the variables in interest. Basing an econometric analysis on a pooled cross-sectional data 
sample often leads to problems of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. To address this issue I 
will apply the adjusted White’s heteroscedasticity consistent estimates for all regressions.  
4.7.2 The Ordinary Least Squares-model (OLS) 
The econometric analysis will apply an OLS multiple regression model. This allows us to 
investigate how our dependent variable varies with a set of independent variables. The model 
can be stated as:  
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑥3 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 𝑢 
where each 𝑥𝑖 represents a new independent variable, and the corresponding 𝛽𝑖 is the 
associated population slope parameter. If u is fixed, the change in y will solely depend on the 
changes in the independent variables. Many factors may potentially be captured in the error 
term u. If there is correlation between an independent variable and an omitted variable, the 
estimates from the model are likely to be biased. For the OLS-model to provide unbiased 
estimators for the population parameters, there are a few key assumptions that need to be 
fulfilled. These assumptions are described in Appendix 10.2, and given that these hold, the 
OLS model will provide the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) of the population 
parameters, and the model we will be suitable for inference. To implement qualitative 
information into the econometric model, a quantitative independent variable might not be 
sufficient. In order to represent specific characteristics of the unity of interest one may apply 
binary variables, often referred to as dummy variables. (Balsvik, 2013) 
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5. Prior research 
In this section I will present prior research related to the two topics I wish to examine. The 
impact of initial demand on the aftermarket performance is covered by both international and 
Norwegian studies, and these differ in both methodology and results. However, there are no 
Norwegian studies on the significance of pricing relative to peers. That was also my main 
motivation to perform this study on the Norwegian IPO market.  
5.1 Part1: Initial demand for the issue  
As a proxy for initial demand I will look into two alternative variables: one regarding where 
the final offer price is set relative to the price range, and one regarding how many times the 
book is oversubscribed. The topic of initial demand and its effect on aftermarket 
performance is covered in an extensive amount of prior research.  
5.1.1 Part 1a: Final price relative to indicative price range 
Jay. R. Ritter (2009) investigated the price setting relative to the indicative price range 
disclosed in the preliminary prospectus. In the period 1980-2008 49 % of all US IPOs were 
listed with a final price within the range, while 28 % and 23 % of the IPOs were priced 
below and above the range, respectively. Further, he investigated the differences in returns 
for the different pricing levels (Table 5-1). IPOs priced below the range had an average first 
day return of 3 %, while the issues priced within the range had an average first day return of 
11 %. The IPOs priced above the range had an average first day return of 39 %. (Ritter, 
2009) 
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Table 5-1: Abnormal returns with respect to pricing relative to range, Ritter (2009) 
 
Almost two decades earlier, Hanley (1993) performed a similar study. He examined US 
IPOs in the period 1983-1987, and found lower initial returns than Ritter (2009). Hanley 
found 63 % of the IPOs to go public with an offer price within the price range, and 27 % and 
10 % below and above the range, respectively. In Hanley’s sample, offerings going public 
below the indicative price range on average had an initial return of 0.6 %, while offerings 
going public within the range had an initial return of 10 %. The offerings going public above 
the range had an average initial return of 20.7 %. He found the differences in returns 
between the pricing levels to be significantly different from zero on 99 % level. Hanley also 
found that although the short-run returns are related to the relationship between the final 
offer price and the indicative price range, the long-run performance cannot be explained by 
revisions in the offer price. (Hanley, 1993) 
Bakke, et al. (2011) investigated more than 5,000 US IPOs in the time frame 1981-2008. The 
authors define the offerings going public below the price range as Low Demand State (LDS), 
the offerings going above the range as High Demand State (HDS), and the offerings going 
public within the range as Medium Demands State (MDS). They confirm Ritter’s and 
Hanley’s findings, observing that average initial returns for LDS is low, while it is higher for 
MDS and highest for HDS. In addition, they investigated how the distribution across the 
pricing levels was affected by the general market conditions. In bear markets 48 % of the 
offerings were LDS, while in bull markets 42 % of the offerings were HDS. Regardless of 
market situation Ritter found 28 % and 23 % of the IPOs to be LDS and HDS, respectively. 
Percentage of IPOs relative to indicative price range
Below Within Above
1980-1989 30% 57% 13%
1990-1998 27% 49% 24%
1999-2000 18% 38% 44%
2001-2008 34% 44% 22%
1980-2008 28% 49% 23%
Average first-day returns relative to indicative price range
Below Within Above
1980-1989 0% 6% 20%
1990-1998 4% 11% 32%
1999-2000 8% 26% 121%
2001-2008 3% 10% 30%
1980-2008 3% 11% 39%
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As Bakke, et al. examined the same IPO market in the same period as Ritter, these findings 
therefore indicate that market conditions may affect where the final price is set relative to the 
range. Thus, it will be important for me to control for the market conditions in the regression 
model. (Bakke, et al., 2011) 
Similar studies have been done for the Norwegian IPO market. Samuelsen and Tveter (2006) 
primarily focused on oil related IPOs in Norway in the period 2001-2005. Their data sample 
consists of 38 IPOs, of whom only 12 were oil related. Due to the limited sample size, the 
findings should be interpreted with caution. For the whole sample they found an abnormal 
initial return of 2.21 %. The oil related stocks had a higher abnormal initial return of 4.84 %, 
compared to the non-oil related stocks with an abnormal initial return of 1.12 %. These 
numbers are considerably lower than for international studies. The authors argue that this can 
be attributed to the increased share of book building IPOs in Norway, which is believed to 
give a more accurate IPO pricing, and hence less fluctuations in the aftermarket. Samuelsen 
and Tveter also argue that business leaders may no longer be willing to “leave money on the 
table”, as researchers have shed light upon the aspect of underpricing and immense abnormal 
initial returns. Consistent with Ritter (2009) and Hanley (1993) they further investigate the 
difference in performance with respect to the pricing relative to the range. As they observed 
few IPOs priced outside the range, Samuelsen and Tveter instead distinguished between 
IPOs priced above and below the price range midpoint. In their sample, 61 % of the IPOs 
were priced below midpoint. For all companies (regardless of sector), the companies priced 
below midpoint had an average abnormal return of -1.31 %, while the IPOs priced above 
midpoint had an abnormal return of 5.5 %. However, neither the abnormal returns, nor the 
difference between the two groupings proved significantly different from zero. (Samuelsen 
& Tveter, 2006) 
Ellingsen (2012) examined Norwegian IPOs in the period 2006-2011. As stated in Table 5-2, 
the average abnormal initial return for the whole sample was 2.41 %, in line with the returns 
for the period 2001-2005 (Samuelsen & Tveter, 2006). In the years before the financial crisis 
in 2008, the average first day abnormal return was 3.68 %, while it was -0.97 % in the years 
after the crisis. For the whole sample, Ellingsen found a negative first week abnormal return 
of -1.06 %, with particularly poor performance in the years after the financial crisis, when 
the first week abnormal returns were -4.6 %. 
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Table 5-2: Average abnormal returns for the different time horizons, Ellingsen 
(2012) 
 
Ellingsen made the same distinction as Samuelsen and Tveter with regards to the pricing 
relative to the price range midpoint. She points to Derrien (2005), who found European IPOs 
to be less frequently priced outside the range compared to US IPOs. In the years 2006-2011 
65 % of the Norwegian IPOs were priced below midpoint, a slightly higher share than the 61 
% Samuelsen and Tveter found for the years 2001-2005. The tendency of low pricing was 
particularly true for the years 2008-2011, where 80 % were priced below midpoint.  
The IPOs in Ellingsen’s sample priced above midpoint had an average initial return of 5.5 %, 
compared to the IPOs priced below midpoint with 2.2 %. The difference proved to be small 
in the years prior to the crisis. However, as Table 5-3 illustrates, the differences were 
magnified in the years after the crisis.  
Table 5-3: Abnormal returns with respect to pricing relative to range, Ellingsen 
(2012) 
 
Ellingsen included a dummy variable to take into account that some IPOs made available a 
stabilization mechanism through a green-shoe option. She found this variable to be far from 
significant, which is in line with Hanley (1993), who also found the green shoe option to be 
insignificant on initial returns. Hence, I will not control for this in my analysis. Ellingsen 
further controlled for the market returns prior to listing. However, she does not control for 
the general volatility of the markets. Practitioners often refer to the volatility when 
determining whether investors are receptive to IPOs or not. I will most likely choose to 
control for both market returns and market volatility. Consistent with Ellingsen, I will also 
2006 - Aug 2008 Sept 2008 - 2011 Total
First day 3.68% -0.97% 2.41%
First week 1.07% -4.60% -1.06%
Total First day First week
Offer price ≥ Midpoint 5.51% 2.10%
Offer price < Midpoint 2.22% -1.55%
2006 - Aug 2008 First day First week
Offer price ≥ Midpoint 5.54% 1.18%
Offer price < Midpoint 3.43% 0.83%
Sept 2008 - 2011 First day First week
Offer price ≥ Midpoint 5.36% 6.37%
Offer price < Midpoint 0.26% -5.31%
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control for the size of the IPO company, to avoid a potential size effect to be captured by any 
other unrelated independent variable. However, the assessments regarding the control 
variables will be described later. (Ellingsen, 2012) 
5.1.2 Part 1b: Level of oversubscription 
The relationship between the level of oversubscription and aftermarket performance is in 
research context a relatively unchartered territory, as it requires information that is not 
publicly disclosed. Kenourgios, et al. (2007) are some of the few researchers that have 
touched upon this relationship. The authors examined this relationship for the Greek IPO 
market in the period 1997-2002, for the first day, first week and first month after listing. 
They found a correlation between oversubscription and the abnormal returns the first day of 
0.799, implying a very strong relationship. In their sample, the average oversubscription 
level was found to be 89.96 times the number of shares to be issued. These levels of 
oversubscription were related to abnormal returns of 54.3 %, 45.3 % and 43.8 % for first 
day, week and month, respectively. Not surprisingly, the authors found the level of 
oversubscription to be significant for the initial returns. (Kenourgios, et al., 2007) 
Wai Wai (2013) performed a similar study for the Malaysian IPO market in the period 2006-
2011, and found an average oversubscription rate of 26.7 times the shares to be issued. He 
further found the correlation between the oversubscription ratio and the initial return to be 
0.364, which is less than half of what Kenourgios, et al. (2007) found. We should note that 
both Wai Wai and Kenourgios, et al. rely on fixed-price offerings only. As the price is held 
fixed in their samples, the pricing dynamics with regards to over subscription may behave 
differently than what we will observe in our sample, as our sample primarily consists of 
book building IPOs.   
Although it seems to be a strong relationship between the level of oversubscription and 
initial return, the level of oversubscription is not necessarily a strong indicator whether the 
IPO is “hot” or “cold” (high or low initial demand for the issue). At the very basic level, the 
level of oversubscription should be an indicator of the demand of issue shares relative to the 
number of available shares. However, as Cowan (2012) points out, investors often inflate 
their indications of interest, as they anticipate only receiving a fraction of the allocation they 
demand. He therefore argues that if an IPO is oversubscribed and still does not provide 
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abnormal initial returns, this may imply that the price is too high, and that the 
oversubscription (i.e. demand) in some degree is artificial (Cowan, 2012).  
5.2 Part 2: Pricing relative to listed comparable companies 
As discussed in the paragraphs above, prior research has found the placement of the final 
offer price relative to the range to be a solid predictor for the aftermarket performance. I 
want to test if this still holds if we control for another aspect of relative pricing, namely the 
pricing of the IPO company relative to a set of comparable companies. This is a less 
explored area within the IPO pricing literature.   
Ritter and Kim (1999) investigated the possibilities of pricing IPOs based on valuation 
multiples of comparable companies. They examined US IPOs in the period 1992-1993, and 
justify the short time horizon with the proposition that one would observe secular differences 
in valuation multiples over longer time horizons. The authors attempt to identify the 
usefulness of numerous multiples, such as P/E (share price divided by earnings per share), 
P/S (share price divided by sales per share), P/B (share price divided by book value per 
share) and EV/EBITDA (enterprise value divided by operating earnings). They define the 
“fair value” of the company as the closing price after the first day, as they assume the 
efficient markets to eliminate any potential mispricing immediately. Consequently, as they 
found an average abnormal return of 12 % for the first day, they argue that the valuation 
multiples of the IPO companies in their sample should be 12 % lower than for listed peers. 
Using trailing earnings and sales data to calculate the multiples gave poor results, while 
using estimates for the next twelve months significantly improved the predictions. They 
stress the importance of choosing comparable companies based on a discretionary 
assessment, rather than an algorithm looking for similarities in sales, profit margins and 
other numeric measures. They further test the idea about the difficulties of pricing young 
companies with high growth rates, and found a higher pricing error for young companies 
than for mature companies. One weakness of their analysis, as they point out, is to use the 
same set of multiples for all industries, while in practice analysts may apply certain multiples 
for certain industries. However, this is a necessity of practical reasons, and a weakness that 
will be present in my analysis as well. They also point to the incentives of investment 
bankers as a potential source of error. As the universe of listed companies is very large, they 
argue that the investment bankers have the opportunity to make a “hot” IPO look fairly 
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priced at high multiples by choosing peers with high multiples, and correspondingly make a 
“cold” IPO look attractive by using peers with low multiples. (Ritter & Kim, 1999) 
Based on the same framework as Ritter and Kim, I will test whether the mispricing on 
valuation multiples corresponds to the abnormal returns. However, unlike Ritter and Kim, I 
suspect that the markets will require more than one day to eliminate the mispricing, and 
hence I will also examine this relationship for first week and first month. In addition, as I 
will control for other aspects than the peer pricing in my model, I will have to compare the 
mispricing on the valuation multiples to the coefficient associated with the peer pricing 
variable rather than the initial returns, as it is the ceteris paribus effect that is of interest. 
Further, the authors do not examine how the relative peer pricing affects the aftermarket 
performance, which is what I seek to do in my analysis. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) recognise that most research on underpricing of 
IPOs relates to whether the stock skyrockets the first day or not. As one historically has 
observed large initial returns, researchers have concluded that IPOs are indeed underpriced. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan, who examined more than 2,000 US IPOs in the years 1980-
1997, argue that likely inefficiencies in the securities markets invalidate the assumption 
regarding the immediate elimination of mispricing. They therefore apply another approach, 
similar to what I seek to do in this thesis. Instead the authors define the “fair value” of the 
IPO company to be based on relative pricing compared to a group of listed peers. To 
determine this fair value the authors apply the multiples P/EBITDA (share price divided by 
operational earnings per share), P/E (share price divided by earnings per share) and P/S 
(share price divided by sales per share). As rationalised in section 4.5, I will base my 
analysis on the P/E and EV/EBITDA multiples. Purnanandam and Swaminathan define 48 
industry groupings based on Fama and French (1997), and choose the peer groups by their 
similarity to the IPO company in terms of their operating characteristics. These groupings 
should reflect similar operational risk, profitability and growth.  
I am of the opinion that industry averages may provide poor comparative basis due to large 
intra-industry variations in company characteristics. Hence, I will create a unique peer group 
for each IPO company in my sample. However, while earlier research generally found IPOs 
to be systematically underpriced, Purnanandam and Swaminathan surprisingly found the 
IPOs in their sample to be systematically overpriced relative to peers. The overpricing ranges 
from 14 % to 50 %, depending on which control variables that are included in the model. 
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The lowest overpricing of 14 % was obtained when controlling for analyst earnings 
forecasts. They suggest that this might indicate that investors rely too heavily on optimistic 
earnings forecasts, rather than current profitability. To investigate whether the relative 
pricing affects the returns in the aftermarket, they divided the stocks into three groups: High, 
medium and low priced IPOs. The authors observed that overvalued stocks outperformed 
undervalued stocks the first day, and underperformed in the long run. They acknowledge that 
the high performance of overvalued IPOs the first day is inconsistent with asymmetric 
information theory, which would suggest underperformance of such stocks. However, they 
argue that the underperformance in the long run proves the relative peer valuation of IPOs to 
be a solid method to determine fair value of IPOs. (Purnanandam & Swaminathan , 2003) 
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6. Method 
In this section I will describe where and how I have gathered the necessary data, and the 
conduction of the analysis. A couple of challenges had to be overcome along the way, which 
required certain assumptions and approximations. These will be thoroughly outlined and 
rationalised.  
6.1 Identifying relevant listings 
Oslo Stock Exchange (hereafter referred to as OSE) discloses all new listings on their 
website with date, price, number of shares and total issue size. A large number of listings 
have successfully been executed in the past 10 years, however, the financial crisis in 2008 
completely disrupted the possibility for companies to go public. Henry and Gregoriou (2013) 
argue that there has been a significant increase in the level of scrutiny of new issues by both 
investors and regulators, which in turn have made the IPO processes more difficult and 
lengthy. They also argue that companies going public after the crisis are significantly larger 
in terms of sales volume than the IPOs prior to the crisis (Henry & Gregoriou, 2013). The 
difference in the IPO climate is supported by Fauzi, et al. (2012), who found the financial 
crisis to significantly and negatively affect the short-term initial returns for IPOs. Ellingsen 
(2012) could confirm this tendency for the Norwegian market as well, as she found higher 
abnormal returns for IPOs before than after the crisis. As the main goal of this thesis is to 
analyse the relationship between aftermarket performance and the two factors initial demand 
and relative peer pricing, fundamental secular differences in the dependent variable (i.e. 
aftermarket performance) may result in biased and misleading estimates. This, in turn, may 
deteriorate the inference of the model. In addition, Ritter and Kim (1999) recommend 
restricting the time span when conducting analysis based on valuation multiples, as these 
have proven to fundamentally change over larger time periods. Obvious practical limitations 
also impose restrictions on the ability to prolong the time period further back than the 
financial crisis. The availability of peer companies for the oldest IPOs may be limited, as a 
large number of today’s relevant peers may have been listed in later years, and relevant peers 
at the date of listing may have been delisted. After an overall assessment of the arguments 
above, I will base my analysis on the Norwegian IPOs in the years 2009 and up to October 
2014, in total 49 listings.  
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6.2 Abnormal returns 
The abnormal returns of the newly listed stock will function as the dependent variable in the 
regression model. As described earlier, prior research base their analysis on the proposition 
that the efficient markets eliminate mispricing the first day. As I suspect the markets to 
require more time to eliminate this mispricing, I will also investigate the returns after the 
first week and first month.  
To obtain the returns after the first day, week and month I will need the historical closing 
prices for the IPO companies, which I extract from Bloomberg and Factset. I compare the 
prices from the two databases to check for any irregularities or errors. Further, if a company 
executes a split in the time frame we analyse, the returns will come out wrong if the non-
adjusted share prices are applied. However, as none of the companies in the sample executed 
splits within the first month after listing, the non-adjusted share prices can be applied 
directly together with the offer price from the prospectus. As the offer price by default is 
non-adjusted, this will provide the correct returns.   
To calculate the abnormal returns, I also need the daily closing prices for a reference index 
in the same period. Based on the arguments presented in the theory section and discussions 
with practitioners, I chose the OSEBX index (Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index) as 
reference index, which is supposed to contain a representative sample of the companies 
listed on OSE. When comparing the returns of IPO companies with alternative investments, 
this broad index will be appropriate, especially since the characteristics, size and maturity of 
the companies in our sample differs substantially. As companies going through the IPO 
process often are small, with a different risk profile than large and mature companies, a 
narrower index as OBX, which consist of the 25 largest companies on OSE, will not in 
adequate extent reflect the risk profile of subscribing to IPOs.  
6.3 Part 1: Initial demand for the issue  
6.3.1 Part 1a: Final price relative to indicative price range 
In book building IPOs the underwriters will disclose an indicative price range in the 
prospectus. This is the price range investors must adhere to during the book building period. 
During this period the underwriters will get a sense of where they can set the final offer price 
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with sufficient coverage of high quality investor bids. Occasionally, the underwriters update 
the price range during the book building period based on feedback from the investor 
community. This was done for a couple of the IPOs in our sample. However, the updates 
were only crimping of the initial price ranges, and it was done only a day or two before the 
books closed. Although this may be taken as an indicator of the demand for the issue, this 
aspect will sufficiently be revealed through the placement of the final offer price relative to 
the initial price range, and hence not reveal any new information. Thus, I will not include a 
control variable for these few instances, as it will sequester degrees of freedom in my model.   
Only five out of the 49 IPOs in our sample were executed with a fixed price. As our data 
sample already is rather small for an econometric analysis, all data points will be very 
important. The fixed price issues should therefore ideally be included. For the book building 
issues, the number of shares is held fixed, while the final offer price is set somewhere 
relative to the price range. On the other hand, for the fixed price issues, a range is set for the 
number of shares to be issued and the price is held fixed. Common for both instances is that 
the range defines the upper and lower limit of the proceeds the company is believed to be 
able to raise. The purpose of the price range variable is to capture the demand effect on the 
aftermarket performance. Therefore it becomes less relevant whether you hold the offer price 
or quantity of shares fixed. Following from this, for the IPOs executed with fixed price, a 
proxy will be to investigate where the final number of shares is set relative to the range, as 
this will equally reflect the supply and demand dynamics as for the book building issues. 
Consequently, we do not need to exclude the fixed price issues. One might argue that the 
offer price, regardless of method, is more important than the number of shares to be issued, 
as the price will determine the market value of the entire equity in the company. However, I 
believe the relative peer pricing variable will capture the valuation aspect in sufficient 
degree, and hence justify the proxy for the fixed price issues.  
Three of the companies going public in the period are clean demergers from their respective 
parent company. In these instances the offer price is based on a proportion of the value of the 
parent company at a certain date. Naturally, it will not be possible to capture the demand 
dynamics in these instances. Thus, the three demergers are excluded from the sample.  
As described in the prior research section, international studies often rely on dummy 
variables to distinguish between issues going public with an offer price below, within or 
above the price range. However, it becomes evident that few of the IPOs in my sample went 
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public with an offer price outside the range, and hence it will be more meaningful to divide 
the issues into two categories: the companies going public below the price range midpoint 
and the companies going public at or above the midpoint. This approach is consistent with 
both Samuelsen and Tveter (2006) and Ellingsen (2012). This distinction only requires one 
dummy variable, and consequently increases the degrees of freedom in our model relative to 
the more traditional threefold distinction. As our sample is on the small side for an 
econometric analysis, this argument is compelling.  
6.3.2 Part 1b: Level of oversubscription 
In prior research, the initial demand aspect has often been reflected through where the final 
offer price is set relative to the indicative price range, similar to the methodology just 
presented. However, it should also be possible to capture the demand effect by observing 
how many times the book is oversubscribed.  
The data on book coverage in IPOs is not publicly disclosed. I have gained access to 
oversubscription data in the offerings where ABG Sundal Collier has been involved. ABG 
has for the relevant time period executed a large share of the Norwegian IPOs, and hence the 
data points may be sufficient in numbers to conduct a statistical analysis. I will return to the 
potential implications of few observations (relative to the other variables), and how this may 
affect the inference, in the analysis section.  
For the level of oversubscription I have data on how many times the books are covered at the 
final offer price. Due to selection bias it can be deceptive to assume a linear relationship for 
this variable. We will obviously not observe any IPOs with book coverage below 1, and it is 
also reasonable to assume the effect of oversubscription on the aftermarket performance to 
diminish above a certain level of oversubscription. However, these potential implications 
will be further discussed in the analysis section.  
6.4 Part 2: Pricing relative to listed comparable companies 
This part of the thesis will address the pricing of the IPO companies relative to listed 
comparable companies, and how this may affect the aftermarket performance of the newly 
listed stock. As described in the prior research section, Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2003) relied on Fama and French-based industry groupings as comparative basis for the IPO 
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companies. However, I am of the opinion that this approach may provide inaccurate 
estimates and hence constitute a potential source of error. Thus, I will construct a unique 
peer group for each IPO company, where the operating characteristics of the IPO company 
should be better reflected than through an industry grouping.  
Ritter (1999) recommends choosing peer groups based on a discretionary assessment, rather 
than a standardized algorithm focusing on certain parameters, e.g. sales numbers, size, 
growth rate and so on so forth. Six weeks after the IPO, brokerage firms are allowed to 
release their initiating coverage analysis of the newly listed company. This is a thorough 
analysis, including company description, earnings forecasts and their perception of the value 
of the company. Most of these analyses include a multiple valuation section, based on 
current valuation of comparable companies. I have extracted the lists of peers from these 
analyses, and supplemented with peer suggestions from Bloomberg and Factset. Then, I 
conducted an assessment of the operational similarities with the IPO company, in order to 
create the final peer group.  
For all peers I gathered EPS and EBITDA estimates for the next twelve months from the 
listing date of their associated IPO company. I applied the forecast multiples as this proved 
more suitable than trailing multiples (Ritter & Kim, 1999). This is also the most common 
practice by analysts. I further gathered the historical share prices and enterprise values for 
the same companies to be able to calculate the P/E and EV/EBITDA multiples. I had to 
exclude the comparable companies with negative earnings estimates, as this would provide 
meaningless multiples. On the other hand, one might also observe very high multiples. Such 
instances are most likely due to company specific factors and hence not useful as comparable 
basis. I therefore excluded the extreme multiples by setting upper limits for both P/E and 
EV/EBITDA. After adjusting for these instances, the peer groups ranged from 4 to 12 peers 
for each IPO company, and the final data set consisted of approximately 400 comparable 
companies. The collection and adjustment of the estimates for each company was obviously 
a time consuming exercise, however, I felt it to be more accurate to create specific peer 
groups for each IPO company, as estimated industry averages may provide poor comparative 
basis. 
For the IPO companies the EPS and EBITDA consensus estimates will be available in 
Factset and Bloomberg after the initiating coverage analyses are released six weeks after 
listing. As earnings estimates are updated relatively infrequently, an approximation will be to 
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use the estimates that come with the initiating coverage analyses, and assume that these 
would have been the same at the date of listing. I did spot checks and went through the stock 
exchange releases in the period in-between, to check for any potential earnings indications 
that might affect these estimates. No such releases appeared, and hence this approximation 
should be satisfying. The multiples for the IPO companies will be: 
𝑃
𝐸
=
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
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where outstanding shares will include the newly issued shares and the net debt is total debt 
less cash and cash equivalents at the time of listing. The consensus estimates for EPS and 
EBITDA are for the next twelve months from listing date.  
As discussed in the theory section, companies are often in a state of high and costly growth 
at the time of listing. Consequently, the EPS and EBITDA estimates might be negative for 
the next twelve months. Again, as our data sample is relatively limited, approximations 
would be necessary for these companies. All initiating coverage analyses contain full year 
estimates for EPS and EBITDA for at least three years ahead. As we are interested in the 
relative pricing aspect we can simply raise our sights and look for the first full year of 
positive earnings for the IPO company. If we compare the valuation for this year with the 
peer group averages for the same year we will still maintain the relative pricing aspect. It is 
reasonable to assume that the investors will look for the first year of positive earnings when 
evaluating the relative pricing of the company.  
The quantitative variable for relative peer pricing is calculated by dividing the multiple of 
the IPO company by the average multiple of the peer group. Hence, a “fairly priced” IPO 
company will have the value 1. A 10 % overpricing will give the value 1.1 and 
correspondingly an underpricing of 10 % the value 0.9. To avoid poor comparable basis, 
outliers caused by company specific factors will be excluded from the statistical calculations, 
as these will adversely affect the inference of the model.  
Instead of applying a quantitative variable, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) 
constructed dummy variables to distinguish between low, medium and high priced IPOs. In 
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the analysis section I will examine the potential benefits of including the peer pricing aspect 
as dummy variables rather than a quantitative variable. Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
further found the distribution of the relative pricing to be skewed, and hence a standard t-test 
assuming normal distribution proved insufficient. Depending on the distribution of the 
pricing in my sample, I will have to choose between the standard t-test and a distribution-
free test. The mathematical equations and description of both methods can found in 
Appendix 10.4 and Appendix 10.5, respectively.  
6.5 Control variables 
If certain factors that are not accounted for in the model affect the abnormal returns and also 
correlate with the independent variables, we might experience problems with omitted 
variable bias. As the coefficients of the independent variables may capture the effect of the 
unrelated factors, the estimation of the independent variables’ associated coefficients may be 
misleading and invalid for inference. In order to avoid omitted variable bias, I will therefore 
include certain control variables in the regression model. Although many factors may 
potentially affect the returns, I would have to limit the number of control variables in order 
to remain an acceptable number of degrees of freedom. Below I will present the few 
variables I intend to include.  
6.5.1 Market returns 
As discussed in the prior research section, the general market conditions may affect the 
success of the listing, with regards to both pricing and aftermarket performance, and 
ultimately also for the probability that the issue will sell. To control for this potential impact, 
I will create a variable to represent the market development in the time up to listing. In line 
with all presented research (e.g. Bakke, et al. (2011)), this aspect will be included as a 
dummy variable. As the OSEBX index functions as reference index for the abnormal return 
calculations, this index will also represent the general market returns for this control 
variable. I distinguish between bull and bear markets, and define bull markets as positive 
returns of the OSEBX index for the three months prior to the listing. Hence, this variable 
will have the value 1 if the IPO goes public in bull markets, and 0 otherwise.  
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6.5.2 Volatility of the market 
In addition to the distinction between bull and bear markets, I will take into account the 
general volatility of the markets. Practitioners often talk about the “IPO window”, and 
whether this is “open” or “closed”. What they refer to is whether or not the investors are 
receptive to IPOs to the extent that the underwriters will be able to cover the book on 
acceptable terms. Practitioners often use the volatility of the markets as an indicator of how 
receptive the investors are to new issues. For this purpose, the VIX index, a put-option based 
index connected to the S&P500, will function as a reference point. When insecurity rise in 
the markets, investors will acquire insurance to protect for losses related to declining 
markets. When investors increase their level of insurance through put-options, this index will 
rise. Based on input from practitioners, the VIX index value of 20 is perceived to be the 
distinction between an open and closed IPO window. One could also apply a corresponding 
volatility index based on the OBX. Oil related companies constitute a large share of the 
companies included in the OBX, which also applies for the companies in my sample. Hence, 
one may argue that the OBX volatility index would better reflect the volatility related to the 
Norwegian IPOs. However, I was not able to obtain data on this index. In addition, 
practitioners most frequently referred to the VIX, and had no clear perception of what index 
value that would define an open or closed window with the OBX volatility index. Hence, I 
will base my control variable for volatility on the VIX index.  
6.5.3 Size of the IPO company 
In discussions with practitioners within the Norwegian issue market, the first thing they 
point out attempting to explain the large deviations in abnormal returns is the size of the 
companies going public. In addition, prior research has proven that the size of the IPO 
company may have an impact on the aftermarket performance. Yong (2011) found a 
negative size effect, i.e. that small IPO companies significantly outperformed large IPO 
companies. It may be reasonable to assume that the size of the company may also affect the 
relative pricing of the company. Thus, if size is not controlled for, the model may provide 
biased estimates. To further strengthen this argument, Ritter and Kim (1999) pointed out that 
the pricing error based on peer valuation was larger for young companies. As age and size 
are believed to be closely correlated, a control variable on size may limit the potential 
pricing error for these companies. In addition, many institutional investors face restrictions 
regarding the size of the companies they are allowed to invest in. The ceteris paribus effect 
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of this will be that the investors that are allocated shares in the large companies on average 
are of higher quality than for the small companies. IPOs with a large share of high quality 
investors have, historically, been associated with better aftermarket performance than IPOs 
with a large share of low quality investors. This aspect may alone make size a determining 
factor for the aftermarket performance. 
To define the size of the company one may apply both equity value and enterprise value. In 
my analysis I will base the control variable on enterprise value. As discussed in the theory 
section, I am of the opinion that this is the most objective assessment of the size, as this 
metric will encompass the entire business and ignore potential differences in capital 
structure. This will limit the potential sources of error in the estimation process. 
The size may be included both as a quantitative variable and a dummy variable. The 
quantitative variable would simply be the NOK based enterprise value of the companies. 
However, prior research, (e.g. Ellingsen (2012)) argued that a dummy variable 
distinguishing between large and small companies proved the most efficient solution. The 
choice of implementation of the size variable in the regression model will be described in the 
introductory analysis in later sections.   
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7. Analysis 
In this section I will first determine and discuss the characteristics of the dependent variable, 
i.e. the abnormal returns of the newly listed stocks. Then I will perform a stepwise high-level 
analysis of the independent variables, and very briefly discuss the relevance of the control 
variables. In the end I will present the regression analysis, enabling isolation of the 
individual impacts of the independent variables on the aftermarket performance.  
7.1 Abnormal returns 
Figure 7-1 illustrates the distribution of the IPOs with respect to the abnormal returns for the 
different time horizons. We observe a longer tail for the negative returns, however, normal 
distribution appears to be a fair approximation for estimation purposes. As a result, the 
standard t-test will be sufficient to determine whether the returns are significantly different 
from zero or not. Due to the limited number of observations, I will allow myself to check the 
significance down to an 85 % level in some instances. 
 
Figure 7-1: Distribution of IPOs with respect to abnormal returns 
Considering all years under one, we observe negative average abnormal returns for all time 
horizons. The abnormal returns deteriorate with the time horizon, indicating that not all 
mispricing is realised the first day. In line with my proposition, this points in the direction of 
partial inefficiency in the markets. However, this will be further investigated when we are 
able to examine the ceteris paribus effect in the regression analysis. The average abnormal 
return for the first day was -2.1 %, significantly different from zero on a 90 % confidence 
 36 
level. For first week and first month the abnormal returns were -4.1 % and -7.0 % 
respectively, significantly different from zero on a 95 % and 99 % confidence level, 
respectively. The negative average abnormal returns for the whole sample contradict all prior 
research I have obtained, as these papers generally have found fundamental underpricing of 
IPOs. Although Norway historically has had lower abnormal returns than many other 
countries, no studies have so far found negative returns over a longer period of time (Ritter, 
et al., 2014). Ellingsen (2012), with a sample reaching from 2006-2011, pointed out that 
Norwegian IPOs in 2009 and 2010 on average actually had negative abnormal returns, 
although not statistically significant. She argued that the average negative returns in these 
years may have occurred due to coincidences and relatively few observations. However, I 
now have 49 data points prolonging her time period, and the tendency does not seem to alter.  
Table 7-1: Abnormal returns for all time horizons 
****Significant on a 99 % level; *** 95 % level; **90 % level; *85 % level 
Table 7-1 shows that all years, besides 2011, have negative average abnormal returns of 
subscribing to IPOs. One might expect the positive returns in 2011 to be due to particular 
high-performers, however, this is only partially true. 2011 had a higher share of IPOs with 
positive returns on all horizons than the other years in the sample. Due to large standard 
deviations and few observations within each year, few of the yearly averages prove 
significantly different from zero. 
Intuitively, it would be reasonable to believe that the climate for IPOs would become more 
favourable the further away we move from the financial crisis. However, this does not seem 
to be true, as the abnormal returns are just as bad for the latter years as for the first years 
after the crisis. This points in the direction of long-lasting effects of the crisis on the 
performance of IPOs in Norway. Although international research has confirmed the negative 
short-term impact of the crisis on the IPO market (e.g. (Fauzi, et al., 2012)), I have not been 
able to obtain any research investigating the endurance of this effect. Thus, I am not able to 
1st day 1st week 1st month # of IPOs
All years -2.1%* -4.1%*** -7.0%**** 49
2009 -2.1% -4.9% -10.4% 2
2010 -4.2% -6.9% -9.8%* 14
2011 7.1% 1.9% 2.4% 7
2012 -3.2% -6.8% -9.6%* 2
2013 -2.7%* -5.6% -6.6%** 11
2014 -4.1%* -2.6% -8.7%** 13
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determine whether the persistent poor performance of Norwegian IPOs after the crisis is a 
country-specific phenomenon or not.   
The negative abnormal returns may have implications beyond the wealth of the investors 
involved in the Norwegian IPOs the past five years. If one takes the stand of the winner’s 
curse explanation of underpricing, this phenomenon of what appears to be persistent 
overpricing might endanger the Norwegian issue market. As described earlier, the winner’s 
curse-explanation suggests that all uninformed investors will subscribe equally and 
indiscriminately to all issues, as long as they on average profit. If the tendency of negative 
initial returns in the Norwegian issue market proceeds, we may observe uninformed 
investors refraining new issues. Thus, the underwriters may struggle to obtain full 
subscription, making it difficult for companies to raise capital by going public. In addition, 
Ellul and Pagano (2003) and Pritsker (2006) suggest that IPOs need to be underpriced to 
compensate investor for the fact that newly listed companies are less liquid than comparable 
companies for some time after listing. Ellul and Pagano argue that aftermarket illiquidity 
stem from asymmetric information that persists after the IPO. Hence, higher stock returns 
need to compensate investors for the losses they can expect from trading with better 
informed investors and for the affiliated risk. If this liquidity premium proceeds to be absent 
this may hamper the book buildings in the future.  
 
One interesting finding regarding the abnormal returns is the predictability of the returns for 
the first week and first month based on the returns the first day. In Figure 7-2 the first week 
abnormal returns (left plot) and first month abnormal returns (right plot) are scattered with 
respect to the first day abnormal returns. The first day performance turns out to be a strong 
Figure 7-2: First week and first month returns scattered with respect to first day returns 
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indicator of the returns for the longer time horizons. For example, observing the 29 
companies with negative abnormal returns the first day, 25 of these had negative abnormal 
returns also after the first month. In 24 of these 25 instances the stock continued to decline 
after first day. A correlation matrix (Table 7-2) further strengthens the evidence of this 
strong relationship, revealing a correlation between the first day and first month returns of 
0.8279. Ritter (1991) found the initial returns to be insignificant for long-term aftermarket 
performance. However, as he examined a three-year horizon, his results are naturally not 
comparable to mine. I have not succeeded in obtaining any research examining this 
relationship for the relatively short time horizons I investigate.  
Table 7-2: Correlation matrix between the dependent variables 
 
It would be interesting to see if the tendency of high predictability is present for a larger 
sample of IPOs, as this stands possible to monetize as a trading strategy. For the fun of it: if 
one had shorted all stocks with negative first day abnormal returns on the second day of 
listing, and realised the position after the first month, one would have an accumulated 
abnormal return of 237.6 % from the end of 2009 and up to present, with a very low level of 
average capital employed. For the IPOs with marginal positive returns the first day the 
returns for the first month tend to be more ambiguous, and my hypothesis is that this may be 
due to the green-shoe option included in some IPOs. To include long positions in the trading 
strategy one should therefore control for the potential disruptions of the green shoe option.  
7.2 Part 1: Initial demand for the issue 
7.2.1 Part 1a: Final price relative to indicative price range 
Out of the 49 IPOs in the sample, 41 applied the book building method. Five IPOs set a fixed 
price in the prospectus, with a range for the number of shares to be issued. Using the proxy 
described earlier, I therefore have data points for 46 out of the 49 companies going public 
regarding where the final offer price is set relative to the indicative price range. The 
1stday 1st week 1st month
1st day 1
1 week 0.6892 1
1st month 0.8279 0.8166 1
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remaining three plain demergers had to be excluded from this part of the analysis. Table 7-3 
summarizes the distribution with regards to the pricing relative to the range.  
Table 7-3: Distribution of IPOs with respect to pricing relative to range 
 
Out of the 46 IPOs, only 10 went public with an offer price at or above (hereinafter referred 
to as above) the price range midpoint, corresponding to 22 % of the IPOs. The remaining 78 
% landed on an offer price below the price range midpoint. Ellingsen (2012), who analysed 
Norwegian IPOs between 2006 and 2010, found 65 % of the IPOs to be priced in this 
manner. Ellingsen further found the financial crisis to increase the share of low-priced IPOs 
from 57 % to 80 %. In the years 2009-2012 86 % of the IPOs in my sample were priced 
below midpoint, while this share decreased to 72 % for the years 2013-2014. The decreasing 
share in the later years indicates that the demand of issues in some degree has recovered after 
the financial crisis, although not entirely.  
In international research papers, we often observe about half of the IPOs priced within the 
price range and one quarter above and one quarter below the price range (see e.g. Ritter, 
2009). In our sample 80 % of the IPOs were priced within the range, and out of these 73% 
were priced in the lower half. The Norwegian IPO market therefore appears more bound by 
the indicative price range, and in addition having a stronger skewness towards the left of the 
midpoint than the international IPO market. The findings are consistent with Derrien (2005), 
who found European IPOs to be less frequently priced outside the range. We found 20 % of 
the IPOs to be priced below the range, compared to Ritter’s (2009) 28 % and Hanley’s 
(1993) 27 %. None of the IPOs in our sample were priced above the range, compared to 10 
% in Hanley’s sample, and 28 % for Ritter. Despite the discrepancy between Ritter’s and 
Hanley’s findings, our results clearly differ from both. Only one company in the sample was 
priced at the upper limit of the range, which stands out compared to Ellingsen (2012), who 
found 23 % of the Norwegian IPOs in the years 2006-2008 to be priced at the upper limit. 
The lower share of IPOs priced at the upper limit may indicate long-term negative pricing 
effects of the financial crisis, however, I have not been able to confirm similar alterations for 
international IPO markets.  
Below midpoint Above midpoint Below range @ lower limit @ upper limit Above range
# of IPOs 36 10 9 17 1 0
% of IPOs 78% 22% 20% 37% 2% 0%
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Although the average abnormal returns are negative for the whole sample, the placement of 
the final offer price relative to the price range can prove to be a solid indicator of the 
aftermarket performance. As Table 7-4 illustrates, the IPOs going public above the midpoint 
had a first day average abnormal return of 1.9 %, and the IPOs going public below midpoint 
had a negative first day abnormal return of -3.1 %. This difference is extrapolated with the 
time horizon, e.g. after one month the IPOs priced above midpoint have an average abnormal 
return of 3.5 %, compared to -9.2 % for the IPOs priced below the midpoint. The returns for 
the IPOs going public with an offer price below midpoint are significantly different from 
zero, while the returns for the IPOs priced above midpoint are not. The difference in 
significance should not be puzzling, as the mean returns are slightly below zero. However, in 
this section, whether or not the returns are significantly different from zero is not the subject 
of interest. As we examine the impact of where the price is set relative to the range, we 
should determine if there is a significant difference between the returns for the IPOs priced 
above and below midpoint.  
Table 7-4: Abnormal returns with respect to the final price relative to the price range 
(Returns based on the 46 IPOs with data on price range) 
****Significant on a 99 % level; ***95 % level; **90 % level; *85 % level 
Examining the whole sample, the differences in returns for the IPOs priced above and below 
midpoint are of considerable size for all time horizons, with a difference of 5.0 % for the 
first day and as much as 12.8 % for the first month. The differences are significant on an 85 
% level for first day and 90 % level for first month. Samuelsen and Tveter (2006) found the 
first day difference to be 6.8 % for the Norwegian IPOs in the years 2001-2005, while 
Ellingsen (2012) found it to be 3.3 % for the Norwegian IPOs between 2006 and 2011. 
2009-2014 1st day 1st week 1st month # of IPOS
All -2.0% -3.9%*** -6.6%**** 46
Offer price ≥ Midpoint 1.9% -0.4% 3.5% 10
Offer price < Midpoint -3.1%** -4.9%**** -9.3%**** 36
Difference 5.0%* 4.5% 12.8%**
2009-2012 1st day 1st week 1st month # of IPOS
All -0.4% -3.9%** -5.3% 22
Offer price ≥ Midpoint 5.5% 6.4% 15.7% 3
Offer price < Midpoint -1.3% -5.5%*** -8.6%*** 19
Difference 6.8%* 11.9%** 24.2%**
2013-2014 1st day 1st week 1st month # of IPOS
All -3.5%** -4.0%* -7.7%*** 24
Offer price ≥ Midpoint 0.3% -3.3% -1.8% 7
Offer price < Midpoint -5.0%*** -4.3%** -10.2%**** 17
Difference 5.4% 0.9% 8.4%
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Ellingsen further found the difference to be 3.7 % for the first week, compared to my result 
of 4.5 %. For the first month horizon I have no comparative basis.  
When splitting the dataset into the two time periods 2009-2012 and 2013-2014, with 22 and 
24 IPOs in each period respectively, we observe large alterations in both average abnormal 
returns and the differences in abnormal returns between the two pricing levels (Table 7-4). 
Reviewing the years 2009-2012, the differences more than double for the first week and the 
first month, and are significant on an 85 % level for the first day and a 90 % level for both 
the first week and the first month. For the period 2013-2014, the differences are substantially 
lower than prior years and insignificant for all time horizons. This may indicate that where 
the final offer price is set relative to the price range no longer have the same prediction value 
for the aftermarket performance as for earlier years. At the same time, the average abnormal 
returns have deteriorated from the first to second time period. In short; the returns of 
subscribing to IPOs have worsened, and it has also become harder to distinguish between the 
“good” and “bad” IPOs based on the final pricing relative to the price range. 
The apparent breakup of the relationship between the price setting relative to the range and 
the aftermarket performance is remarkable. There are many potential explanations for this 
break up. However, I believe the answer may lie in the underlying pricing dynamics. The 
distribution with regards to size shows a large number of very small companies going public 
the last two years. As discussed earlier, restrictions regarding size for institutional investors 
justify the assumption that small companies on average have a set of lower quality investors 
than large companies. Thus, the average IPO in the last period may contain an investor base 
of lower quality, relative to the first period. As investor quality historically has proved to 
correlate positively with aftermarket performance, this may explain the lower abnormal 
returns in the last period. In addition, as I will return to later, the smaller companies tended 
to be overpriced in my sample, and hence underperformed the larger companies. This may 
also help explaining the deteriorating returns.  
However, these arguments cannot explain the decreased predictability with regards to where 
the price is set in the range. We know that the placement of the offer price relative to the 
range is a proxy for the level of demand for the issue, assuming the “quality level” of the 
investors to be equal at all final offer prices. However, it may be reasonable to assume that, 
ceteris paribus, the investor quality decreases somewhat the higher you move in the range. If 
this is true, you will have offsetting effects in both ends of the range with regards to the 
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aftermarket performance: In the higher end, the relatively lower investor quality indicates 
poor aftermarket performance, while, at the same time, a high price relative to the range 
indicates high demand and strong aftermarket performance. Reversely, in the low end, a 
relatively higher investor quality indicates strong performance, while the low price relative 
to the range indicates poor demand and weak performance. It is reasonable to assume that 
the intra-range variation in investor quality is higher for the smallest companies. Thus, as the 
average size of the companies is significantly smaller in the last two years, the offsetting 
effect should be stronger. This may explain the reduced predictability in the last period.   
Table 7-5: IPOs priced at the price range limits 
 
Another striking aspect is the high share of IPOs that are priced exactly at the lower limit of 
the range (Table7-5). Out of the 34 companies priced below midpoint, as many as 17 were 
priced at the lower limit of the interval, corresponding to 37 % of the sample. As Ellingsen 
(2012) found 37 % of the IPOs in the period 2006-2011 to be priced at the lower limit as 
well, this phenomenon proves not to be peculiar for later years. There is no theoretical 
reason for why the lower limit price should be more frequently observed than others, 
assuming equilibrium is determined by traditional supply and demand of the issue. 
Intuitively, an IPO being priced below the range should indicate lower demand for the issue, 
and hence one would expect poorer performance in the aftermarket relative to the IPOs 
priced at the lower limit. However, we observe the opposite effect, as the IPOs priced at the 
lower limit significantly underperform the IPOs priced below the range. One possible 
explanation may be found through the incentives for the investment bank acting as advisor. 
Pricing the IPO below the range may indicate that the advisors misinterpreted the investor 
appetite for the issue and failed to determine the correct company valuation. The investment 
bankers may look less competent than if they are be able to set the final price within the 
range they themselves determined prior to the book building. The reluctance of further 
lowering the offer price may cause the underwriter to accept bids from investors of lower 
quality than what they might attain at a lower price. As investors of lower quality in greater 
extent “flip” the stock and sell their share right after listing, the lower-limit IPOs 
1st day 1st week 1st month # of IPOS
All -2.0% -3.9% -6.6% 46
Priced below range -0.1% -1.4% -5.8% 9
Priced at lower limit -4.7% -7.2% -11.1% 17
Difference (@ lower vs below) 4.6% 5.8% 5.3%
Priced at upper limit 11.9% 16.7% 24.8% 1
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significantly underperforms the IPOs priced below the range. Based on this, one may simply 
suggest that the IPOs priced at the lower limit are not worthy their price, and should ideally 
been priced below the range. The significant underperformance also strengthens the 
proposition that investor quality has a considerable impact on the aftermarket performance.  
Although we only have one IPO priced at the upper limit of the range, the returns for this 
stock coincides with the hypothesis, namely that IPOs priced high in the range performs well 
in the aftermarket. This IPO had an abnormal return of 11.9 % the first day, and 24.8 % the 
first month. However, one would obviously need additional observations to ascertain 
anything about the significance of being priced at the upper limit.  
7.2.2 Part 1b: Level of oversubscription 
In Figure 7-3 the first month abnormal returns are scattered with respect to how many times 
the book is covered at the final offer price. It appears to be a linear relationship between the 
two variables, which indicates that the book coverage might be a suitable independent 
variable to represent the initial demand aspect in the regression analysis. However, as 
discussed in the methodology section, the selection bias may be looming for the 
interpretation of the coefficient associated with the book coverage variable. Obviously, there 
will not be any observations with book coverage below 1. In addition, for the IPOs where the 
book is barely covered, the outcome with regards to returns appears highly ambiguous.  
  
Figure 7-3: First month abnormal returns scattered with respect to book coverage 
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A regression with the book coverage as the only independent variable indicates that the 
abnormal returns increase with the level of oversubscription (Table 7-6). The explanatory 
power of this one-variable model is strikingly high, with an adjusted R-squared of 52.12 % 
for the first month. As an example, the interpretation of the coefficient for the first month 
implies that for each time the book is covered, the abnormal return the first month will 
increase by 5.78 %. As the regression output illustrates, the coefficients are highly 
significant for all horizons, which supports the proposition regarding the positive 
relationship between oversubscription and aftermarket performance.  
Table 7-6: Regression with book coverage as independent variable 
 
***significant on 99 % confidence level; **95 % level; *90 % level 
As presented in the prior research section, Kenourgios, et al. (2007) tested the correlation 
between the book coverage and first day abnormal returns, and obtained a correlation of 
0.799. The corresponding correlation in my sample of 0.7001 confirms the strong 
relationship between first day returns and the book coverage (Table 7-7). The average 
oversubscription to the IPOs in my sample is 2.8 times the issued shares, compared to 89.9 
for Kenourgios et al. and 26.8 for Wai Wai (2013). As these studies cover fixed price IPOs, I 
suggest these numbers to not be directly comparable. In book building IPOs, which 
constitute the vast majority of my sample, the final price will be adjusted with regards to the 
level of demand that becomes evident during the book building period. Consequently, the 
final offer price will be revised upwards if the demand for the issue is high. Naturally, the 
oversubscription rate at the final offer price will therefore be lower. However, the correlation 
and impact on the initial returns seem to be aligned with the international studies.  
Table 7-7: Correlation between book coverage and first day abnormal return 
 
As we read from the regression output in Table 7-6, we unfortunately only have 14 
observations on book coverage. As the regression tool requires data on all variables for each 
1st day 1st week 1st month
Coefficient 0.0176** 0.0245* 0.0578***
Standard error 0.0052 0.0086 0.0148
Adjusted R-squared 0.4902 0.3559 0.5212
# of observations 14 14 14
Book coverage 1st day abn. ret.
Book coverage 1.0000
1st day abn. ret. 0.7001 1.0000
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IPO, the IPOs without book coverage data would have to be excluded from the final sample. 
Hence, when including the other independent variables in the regression, the estimation of 
the coefficients would sequester degrees of freedom to the extent that the inference of the 
model would be invalid.  
Although we do not have an adequate number of data points on book coverage to perform an 
econometric analysis, we do not necessarily lose the purpose of this variable, namely to 
investigate the initial demand effect on the aftermarket performance. The variable related to 
where the final price is set relative to the price range may be sufficient in this regard. It is 
reasonable to assume the oversubscription to correlate positively with the price setting 
relative to the range, i.e. an IPO with a high level of oversubscription should end up with a 
price high in the range, and vice versa. A correlation analysis for the two variables provides 
a comfortably high correlation of 0.8554. This inferes that if one of the variables is already 
included in the model, implementing the other will not bring any “new information to the 
table”. The high correlation also indicates that including both variables most likely will lead 
to problems of collinearity, which in turn may result in biased estimators and invalidate the 
inference of the model. Since we have 46 data points on the pricing relative to the price 
range, compared to only 14 data points on the book coverage, it is an easy decision to choose 
the price range variable to represent the initial demand aspect in the final regression.  
7.3 Part 2: Pricing relative to listed comparable companies 
Figure 7-4 illustrates the distribution of the IPOs with respect to the relative peer pricing. 
The P/E and EV/EBITDA multiples illustrate the same pricing image, namely that the 
majority of the IPOs are priced cheaper than peers.  
 
Figure 7-4: Relative pricing compared to listed peers 
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We observe a few outliers priced substantially higher than peers. When calculating the 
relative peer pricing variable, it can be expedient to exclude the extreme values, as these will 
affect the test observator in an inappropriate large extent. As these valuations must be 
assumed to be related to company specific characteristics or estimation errors, they are not 
directly of interest when attempting to infere the pricing of a large sample of IPOs. This 
argument is also strenghtened by the fact that none of these extreme values on one multiple 
were confirmed by an extreme value on the other multiple, indicating that either estimation 
errors or accounting specific conditions are the reasons for the extreme values. When these 
values are excluded, we obtain an underpricing of 9 % and 11 % based on P/E and 
EV/EBITDA, respectively (Table 7-8). As discussed in the prior research section, the 
mispricing on the valuation multiples will be compared to the coefficient of the peer pricing 
variable in the regression analysis in later sections.  
Table 7-8: Relative pricing based on P/E and EV/EBITDA 
 
*Significantly different from 1 on a 90 % confidence level (Based on Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney)  
Rank Sum Test) 
In line with Purnanandam and Swaminathan’s (2003) findings, our observations are heavliy 
skewed to the left (Figure 7-4), and a distribution-free test statistic will be needed in order to 
determine the significance of the results. Thus, I apply the distribution-free two-sided 
Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) Rank Sum Test to determine whether the pricing is significantly 
different from 1, i.e. a significant difference in pricing relative to peers. This test is more 
efficient than a standard t-test for samples that prove to be non-normal. The test confirms the 
underpricing to be significant on a 90 % level for both multiples.  
On one hand the underpricing of the IPOs relative to peers seems strange, having in mind 
that companies going through the IPO process often are young and successful companies 
with high current and future estimated growth rates. Mature peers may have lower growth 
rates, which will justify higher valuation multiples for the IPO companies. On the other 
hand, there is high uncertainty regarding the future operations connected with a company 
with a relatively short track record. Thus, one may argue that investors have to be 
compensated for investing in such high risk companies, and hence require a lower pricing 
relative to peers.  
P/E EV/EBITDA
Relative pricing 0.91* 0.89*
Standard deviation 0.43 0.40
# of observation 40 39
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The underpricing of IPOs in my sample contradicts Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003), 
who found overpricing of IPOs relative to peers. Since there are no prior research on peer 
pricing of Norwegian IPOs, it is hard to determine how my results stand compared to 
historical pricing of IPOs in Norway. A possibe explanation of the underpricing of 
Norwegian IPOs relative to US IPOs may be found in the characteristics of the companies 
going public. IPOs in the US have often been related to high-tech and software related 
companies, while Norwegian IPOs often have been related to asset-heavy oil-related 
companies. Consequently, one may assume that the US IPO companies on average have a 
higher current and estimated growth rate than the Norwegian IPO companies, which may 
explain some of the differences in pricing. However, I have not found any research to back 
up that proposition. In addition, it is important to note that the small sample size makes it 
difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the potential underpricing of Norwegian IPOs.  
  
Figure 7-5: First month abnormal returns scattered with respect to the quantitative 
P/E variable 
In Figure 7-5 the first month abnormal returns are scattered with respect to the quantitative 
P/E variable. It is hard to determine any clear linear relationship between the two variables, 
and hence a quantitative variable may not be appropriate for the final regression model. 
Despite the apparent absence of a linear relationship, there is a tendency of IPOs priced 
above peers to have negative abnormal returns (bottom right quadrant). For the IPOs priced 
below peers, the outcome is more ambiguous, with nearly the same number of IPOs with 
postive and negative abnormal returns (top and bottom left quadrants). This tendency proved 
to be similar for the two other time horizons, as well as for the EV/EBITDA multiple. The 
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apparent difference in performance indicates that the distinction between overpriced and 
underpriced IPOs may serve properly as a predicator for aftermarket performance. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) made the same observation and created dummy 
variables for the relative peer pricing. Although they chose to distinguish between low, 
medium and high priced IPOs, I will only distinguish between underpriced and overpriced 
IPOs, in order to spare degrees of freedom. This variable will have the value 1 if the IPO is 
priced higher than peers, and the value 0 otherwise. 
Investigating the correlation between the first month abnormal returns and the dummy 
variables, we observe a noteworthy relationship, both for P/E and EV/EBITDA. There is 
strong negative correlation between the first month abnormal returns and both valuation 
multiples, with -0.491 for the P/E multiple and -0.413 for the EV/EBITDA multiple. This 
indicates that IPOs priced above its peers should have poorer abnormal returns than the IPOs 
priced below its peers.  
Table 7-9: Pricing distribution based on P/E and EV/EBITDA 
 
From Table 7-9 one can see that the dummy variables entail the same the distribution with 
regards to relative peer pricing as the quantitative variables, namely that the majority of the 
IPOs are priced below peers. In addition, the table confirms the coinciding pricing 
distributions for the P/E variable and the EV/EBITDA variable.  
Table 7-10: Abnormal returns with respect to the relative pricing 
****Significant on a 99 % level; ***95 % level; **90 % level; *85 % level 
In Table 7-10 the abnormal returns for the three horizons are illustrated with respect to the 
relative peer pricing, which appears to have significant impact on the aftermarket 
performance. The negative returns for overpriced IPOs are significantly different from zero 
On P/E multiple On EV/EBITDA multiple
Higher priced than peers 40% 43%
Lower priced than peers 60% 57%
Abnormal returns 1st day 1st week 1st month # of IPOS
Overpriced on P/E -5.6%*** -7.2%*** -14.1%**** 17
Underpriced on P/E 1.0% -1.4% -1.2% 25
Difference 6.6%** 5.8%* 12.9%***
Overpriced on EV/EBITDA -4.3%*** -6.3%*** -12.4%**** 18
Underpriced on EV/EBITDA 0.3% -1.8% -2.0% 24
Difference 4.5%* 4.5% 10.4%**
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on 95 % level for first day and week, and 99 % level for first month with both the P/E and 
EV/EBITDA multiple. We observe large differences between the overpriced and 
underpriced IPOs across all time horizons, and the differences tend to increase with the 
horizon. For the P/E multiple the differences are significant on a 90 % level for first day, 85 
% level for first week and 95 % level for first month. For the EV/EBITDA multiple the 
differences are significant on an 85% level for first day, insignificant for week and 
significant on a 90 % level for the first month.   
In this type of analysis it is important to evaluate the relationship between the different 
independent variables. Our model will include a variable regarding the pricing relative to the 
price range, and it is natural to think that an IPO priced high in the range might also be 
priced high relative to peers, simply because the final valuation ends up richer. We can 
check for collinearity between the two variables, i.e. a linear relationship. For this purpose 
we may conduct a Variance Inflation Factor test (VIF test) (Wooldridge, 2012). This test is 
generally performed to quantify the severity of multicollinearity, and works by calculating 
how much the variance of the coefficients in interest increase due to collinearity. A test 
observator of 10 or more is reason for concern. Running the VIF test on the peer pricing 
variable and the interval pricing variable, we obtain a test observator of 1.001. Hence, it will 
be safe to include both variables in the regression model.  
As discussed in the methodology section, the relative peer pricing aspect may be 
implemented both as quantitative variables and dummy variables. From the cursory analysis 
above it appeared to be no linear relationship between the abnormal returns and the peer 
pricing. Consequently, a quantitative variable may result in poor estimates. On the other 
hand, we observe highly significant differences in returns when distinguishing between 
relatively overpriced and underpriced IPOs, which favors the dummy variable approach. 
This is also most common approach by researchers, among others Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2003). Thus, I choose to apply dummy variables to implement the peer 
pricing aspect into the regression model.  
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7.4 Control variables 
As described in the methodology section, the control variables will be absolutely necessary 
in order to avoid omitted variable bias. In this section I will briefly provide insight into the 
relationship between the dependent variables and the control variables I have chosen to 
include. 
7.4.1 Market returns 
Prior research has indicated that general market conditions may affect where the final price 
ends up relative to the indicative price range. We found 78 % of the IPOs in my sample to be 
priced below midpoint regardless of market conditions. In bear markets this number 
increased to 85 %. In bull markets 24 % of the IPOs were price above midpoint, compared to 
21 % regardless of market conditions. If one observes the share of IPOs priced exactly at the 
lower limit, the distinction between bull and bear markets become more evident. Regardless 
of marked condition, 37 % of the IPOs were priced exactly at the lower limit, while this 
number was 30 % and 54 % for bull and bear markets, respectively.  
Bakke, et al. (2011) define bull markets as positive market returns for the 45 trading days 
before listing. Although this slightly differs from my period of three months (corresponding 
to 60 trading days), their results should work as comparative basis. Bakke, et al. found 42 % 
of the IPOs to be priced above the range in bull markets, while Ritter (2009), who examined 
the same sample of IPOs, found 23 % of the IPOs to be priced above range regardless of 
market conditions. In our sample, no IPOs were priced above the range. In bear markets 
Bakke, et al. found 48 % to be priced below the range, compared to Ritter’s 28 % regardless 
of market conditions. In our sample 20 % were priced below the range regardless of market 
conditions, while the percentage share just slightly increased to 23 % in bear markets.  Thus, 
the fluctuations in pricing due to changes in market conditions appear more modest for the 
Norwegian IPOs than for the US IPOs. Bakke, et al. (2011) stated that “the probability of 
positive first-day returns is higher when public markets are doing well”. We can support 
their statement, as we find the probability of positive the first day to be 42.3 % in bull 
markets, compared to 30.8 % in bear markets.  
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7.4.2 Volatility of the market 
Based on the discussion in the methodology section we want to control for the general 
volatility of the market. In Figure 7-6, the first month abnormal returns are scattered with 
respect to the VIX index values. It is hard to observe any linear relationship between the 
abnormal returns and the index values, and a similar tendency is revealed for the other 
horizons as well. Consequently, this variable will most likely not provide useful information 
in a regression analysis as a quantitative variable. Thus, I will test if implementation as a 
dummy variable may provide better results. Based on input from practitioners, the natural 
dividing line will be the VIX index value of 20, which is believed to be the limit determining 
whether investors are receptive for IPOs or not. Based on interpretation of the scatter plot, it 
is hard to argue that the VIX has any significant impact on the returns for the IPOs going 
public when the VIX is below 20 (top and bottom left quadrants). However, for the VIX 
above 20, we see that most IPOs have negative returns (bottom right quadrant).  
  
Figure 7-6: First week abnormal returns scattered with respect to VIX index values 
This observation is confirmed by the two correlation matrices below (Table 7-11), 
illustrating the correlation between the VIX and first month abnormal returns for IPOs where 
the VIX was below 20 (left matrix) and above 20 (right matrix). The correlation is negligibly 
positive for IPOs in low volatility markets. However, for IPOs going public in high volatility 
markets, there is a negative correlation -0.222. Hence, a dummy variable may provide useful 
input. However, the selection bias will be a serious concern associated with this variable. For 
VIX index values above 20 there are very few data points, simply because the probability of 
observing IPOs in high volatility markets is much smaller than for low volatility markets. As 
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the coefficient may be calculated on uncertain grounds, we must interpret the estimates with 
great caution.  
Table 7-11: First week abnormal returns with respect to the VIX in high- and low 
volatility markets 
 
If we investigate the returns for the IPOs with respect to the volatility at the time of listing, it 
is hard to spot any clear relationship (Table 7-12). Only for the first week abnormal returns, 
there seem to be any considerable difference. However, due to large deviations, the 
difference is not significantly different from zero. Even though this single control variable 
may not prove significant by itself, it might stand out as joint significant with the other 
control variables. This will be further investigated in the section regarding the regression 
analysis.  
Table 7-12: Returns with respect to volatility 
                
***Significant on a 95 % level; **90 % level; *85 % level 
7.4.3 Size of the IPO company 
During my analysis I tested control variables for size based on both equity value and 
enterprise value. Both seemed to correlate considerably with the abnormal returns, however, 
based on the rationalisation in the methodology section, I believe the enterprise value 
variable is easiest to defend on economic ground. When the abnormal returns are scattered 
with respect to the size, no linear relationship becomes evident. Hence, I constructed a 
dummy variable distinguishing between small and large companies. This is consistent with 
Ellingsen (2012) who also found the dummy variable approach to be the most efficient 
solution. The enterprise value of NOK 1,000 million is a natural breaking point, as passing 
this value stands as a milestone for many companies. In addition, this limit also provides 
approximately the same number of IPOs in both categories, which is preferable with regards 
to statistical comparison.  
VIX>20 WeekAbnRet VIX<20 WeekAbnRet
VIX>20 1 VIX<20 1
WeekAbnRet -0.222 1 WeekAbnRet 0.041 1
1st day 1st week 1st month
High volatility -1.5% -6.1%** -6.2%
Low volatility -2.2%* -2.9%* -6.7%***
Difference 0.7% -3.3% 0.5%
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Table 7-13: Abnormal returns with respect to company size 
****Significant on a 99 % level; ***95 % level; **90 % level; *85 % level 
From Table 7-13 it becomes clear that small IPO companies underperform the large IPO 
companies, and the differences are significantly different from zero on a 90 % confidence 
level for first week and first month. This contradicts Yong’s (2011) findings, who found 
small companies to outperform the large companies. To determine whether size is the 
determining factor with regards to the outperformance by large companies, we should check 
if there is a relationship between the size and the relative peer pricing. On the P/E multiple 
the large companies appear underpriced relative to the small companies (Table 7-14). On the 
EV/EBITDA we do not observe this difference. However, if we for this sake base our 
analysis on the P/E multiple, it is consistent with the asymmetric information theory 
regarding IPO pricing that the large companies outperform the small companies, as they 
appear underpriced relative to the small companies. The reason behind the higher valuation 
of small companies may be found in the characteristics of the companies. It is reasonable to 
assume the small companies on average are younger than the large companies. Ritter and 
Kim (1999) found higher growth rates in young companies, and as higher growth rates 
justify higher valuation, this may explain some of the pricing differences in our sample.  
Table 7-14: Relative peer pricing of large vs. small companies 
 
Although the size appears significant for the aftermarket performance, the relationship with 
the peer pricing variable may turn the size insignificant in a regression were both variables 
are included. However, as we discussed in the methodology section, some institutional 
investors face restrictions regarding the size of the companies they are allowed to invest in. 
This may result in a larger share of high quality investors in large companies, which may 
explain the better performance of large companies in our sample. As this aspect may cause 
the size effect to be significant, the size should be controlled for in order to avoid potential 
omitted variable bias.  
1st day 1st week 1st month # of IPOS
EV > NOK 1000m -1.2% -1.1% -3.5% 27
EV < NOK 1000m -3.2% -7.9%*** -11.4%**** 22
Difference 2.0% 6.8%** 7.9%**
P/E EV/EBITDA
Large 0.78 0.90
Small 1.09 0.89
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7.5 Regression analysis 
7.5.1 Presentation of the variables 
The regression analysis will start off with a brief presentation of the relevant variables and 
their characteristics, which are summarized in Table 7-15. As all IPOs with missing values 
on any variable have been excluded from the final sample, we now only have 39 
observations. Note that this may result in means slightly differing from the introductory 
analysis in previous sections. As we can read from the minimum and maximum values in the 
summary table, all independent variables are dummy variables. 
Table 7-15: Summary statistics of the relevant variables 
A more detailed description of the variables may also be found in Appendix 10.6 
The correlations in Table 7-16 give the reader a quick idea whether the hypotheses may hold 
or not. The relationships between the independent variables and the abnormal returns will 
thoroughly be discussed later, and hence I will only briefly comment on this in the 
introductory presentation. In addition, a matrix illustrating the correlations between the 
independent variables may be found in Appendix 10.8.1. 
Table 7-16: Correlations between the dependent and independent variables 
 
Mean Standard dev. Min. Max. # of obs.
DayAbnRet -0.0155 0.0918 -0.2387 0.2490 39
WeekAbnRet -0.0349 0.1038 -0.3052 0.1670 39
MonthAbnRet -0.0583 0.1534 -0.3394 0.2893 39
HigherPE 0.4103 0.4983 0 1 39
HigherEvEbitda 0.4359 0.5024 0 1 39
AboveMidpoint 0.2308 0.4268 0 1 39
mBull 0.6667 0.4776 0 1 39
HighVol20 0.3077 0.4676 0 1 39
EVsize1000 0.6154 0.4929 0 1 39
DayAbnRet WeekAbnRet MonthAbnRet
HigherPE -0.4093 -0.3517 -0.4938
HigherEvEbitda -0.2933 -0.2876 -0.4118
AboveMidpoint 0.2226 0.3557 0.3976
mBull 0.1402 0.0708 0.1659
HighVol20 -0.0949 -0.2918 -0.0519
EVsize1000 0.3042 0.4792 0.3744
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Abnormal returns 
The abnormal returns will function as the dependent variable in the regressions. The 
abnormal returns are calculated for first day, week and month with OSEBX as reference 
index. The mean returns are negative for all horizons, although we observe great variation in 
the sample, e.g. for first day of trading the best performer had a positive abnormal return of 
24.9 % while the worst performer had a negative abnormal return of -23.9 %.  
Pricing relative to listed comparable companies 
To determine the effect of relative peer pricing on the aftermarket performance, I have the 
two dummy variables HigherPE and HigherEvEbitda. The variables will have the value 1 if 
the IPO is overpriced relative to peers and 0 otherwise. Slightly more than 40 % of the IPOs 
are overpriced relative to peers according to both variables, with a mean of 0.410 and 0.436 
for P/E and EV/EBITDA, respectively. In line with the hypothesis, the correlation table 
clearly illustrates the negative relationship between overpricing relative to peers and 
aftermarket performance.  
Final price relative to indicative price range 
The dummy variable AboveMidpoint will represent the aspect of where the final offer price 
is set relative to the price range. This variable will have the value 1 if the IPO goes public 
with an offer price above the price range midpoint and 0 otherwise. From Table 7-15 we 
observe that 23 % of the IPOs are priced above midpoint. Consistent with the hypothesis, the 
positive correlation between AboveMidpoint and the abnormal returns indicates that high 
initial demand for the issue positively affects the aftermarket performance.  
Control variables 
To control for general market returns I have included the dummy variable mBull, which will 
have the value 1 if the market returns are positive for the three months prior to listing. We 
observe that 67 % of the IPOs were executed in bull markets, and positive market returns 
prior to listing appear to positively affect the aftermarket performance of the newly listed 
stock.    
Further, we control for the market volatility through the dummy variable HighVol20. This 
variable will have the value 1 if the IPO is executed with an average VIX index value above 
20 in the three months prior to listing. Only 31 % of the IPOs went public during high-
volatility markets and high volatility appears to negatively affect the abnormal returns.  
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The potential size effect is controlled for through the dummy EVsize1000, which will have 
the value 1 if the IPO company has an enterprise value above NOK 1,000 million. 61 % of 
the companies going public are defined as large companies, and the size correlates positively 
with the abnormal returns.   
7.5.2 Rationalisation of the final model 
As described earlier in the analysis section, the final regression model will consist of a 
considerable number of independent variables and control variables in order to avoid omitted 
variable bias. At the same time, the number of variables will be limited to the absolute 
necessary to avoid seizure of unnecessary degrees of freedom. All models will be level-level 
models, assuming that the variables may be incorporated in their ordinary form. See 
Appendix 10.3 for more information regarding the interpretation of the estimated slope 
parameters. Based on the rationalisation in previous sections, all independent variables will 
be included as dummy variables. This is line with prior research, and has proved to be the 
most efficient implementation of the relevant aspects. Still, as I have two potential variables 
regarding the peer pricing, there are a few different possibilities regarding the 
implementation of this aspect. The following discussion will address this.   
First, I run a regression including both variables on relative peer pricing, HigherPE and 
HigherEvEbitda. This gives the following regression equation: 
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑣𝐸𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 +
𝛽4 ∗ 𝑚𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉𝑜𝑙20 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐸𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒1000 + 𝜀  
The output from this regression may be found in Appendix 10.8.2. Both variables on peer 
pricing basically reflect the same characteristic of the company, however, the variables 
prove different with regards to both magnitude and significance. The coefficient of the P/E 
variable appears more significant with a larger magnitude than the coefficient of the 
EV/EBITDA variable. However, the coefficients are consistent for all time horizons for both 
variables, and the negative coefficients make economic sense, namely that overpriced IPO 
companies will underperform the underpriced IPO companies. Still, one may argue that 
including two variables reflecting the relative peer pricing aspect should make one of them 
redundant. Ideally, one of these variables should alone be able to capture the entire impact of 
peer pricing. This will also increase the degrees of freedom in the model. I therefore run the 
following two regressions, including either HigherPE or HigherEvEbitda: 
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1) 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑚𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉𝑜𝑙20 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐸𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒1000 + 𝜀  
2) 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑣𝐸𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗
𝑚𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉𝑜𝑙20 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐸𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒1000 + 𝜀 
 
The output from these regressions may be found in Appendix 10.8.3 and 10.8.4, 
respectively. Naturally, the two models are not very different. However, the independent 
variables come out more significant in the P/E model than for the EV/EBITDA model. If we 
compare the coefficients of the peer pricing variables for the two regressions we observe 
differences in the magnitudes. Ideally, the total effect of peer pricing should remain 
unchanged regardless of the choice of variables to reflect this aspect in the model. In other 
words, the magnitude of the P/E and EV/EBITDA coefficients should in the last two models 
individually equal the sum of the two coefficients in the model including both. This is very 
close to true for the P/E model, while we observe significant differences for the 
EV/EBITDA model. In addition, the coefficients of the unrelated variables should not be 
affected by how the peer pricing is implemented. These coefficients remain relatively 
unchanged in the P/E model, while changing considerably for the EV/EBITDA model. This 
is a compelling argument for choosing the P/E model. Also, the explanatory power of the 
P/E model is higher than for the EV/EBITDA model, and actually the highest among the 
models presented. Hence, I choose to base my regression analysis on the P/E model.  
7.5.3 The final regression model 
In this section I will thoroughly discuss the final model and interpret the coefficients. I will 
discuss the economic sense of the findings, and further compare these with prior research. 
The stepwise interpretation of the isolated effects will be a continuation of the cursory 
analysis from previous sections. The final regression model is (in this case stated with the 
daily abnormal returns as dependent variable): 
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑚𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉𝑜𝑙20 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐸𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒1000 + 𝜀  
The right hand side of the equation will be identical for all time horizons. Table 7-17 
summarizes the regression, with the coefficients and the associated t-values for each variable 
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for all time horizons. The interpretation of the variables in the following section should be 
seen together with this table.  
Table 7-17: Regression summary 
****Significant on a 99 % level; ***95 % level; **90 % level; *85 % level (Extensive regression output can 
be found in Appendix 10.8.3) 
HigherPE 
We observe the effect of overpricing being highly negative for abnormal returns for all time 
horizons. The coefficient of HigherPE for the first day is -0.0612, indicating that an IPO 
company overpriced on P/E relative to peers ceteris paribus will underperform an IPO 
company underpriced relative to peers by 6.12 % the first day. The coefficient is 
significantly different from zero on a 90 % level for first day and 99 % for first month. From 
earlier we know that the average abnormal returns deteriorate with the time horizon in our 
sample. However, the magnitude of the coefficient for the first week is lower than for first 
day, as well as less significant, although significant on an 85 % level. I will return to this 
phenomenon later, when discussing the increased significance of the control variables for the 
first week horizon.  
All known prior research regarding IPO peer pricing focus on the first day abnormal returns. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) found overpriced IPOs to outperform underpriced 
IPOs. As they themselves point out, this is inconsistent with traditional financial theory, 
more specifically the asymmetric information theory of IPO pricing. This theory suggests 
that an undervalued stock would outperform the first day, as the efficient markets bids up the 
price to fair value immediately. Our findings contradict Purnanandam and Swaminathan, but 
1st day 1st week 1st month
HigherPE -0.0612** -0.0436* -0.1315****
-1.84 -1.55 -2.82
AboveMidpoint 0.0402 0.0683* 0.1318***
1.33 1.55 2.39
mBull 0.0221 0.0283 0.0307
0.82 0.97 0.68
HighVol20 -0.0246 -0.0762**** -0.0279
-0.66 -2.84 -0.61
EVsize1000 0.0378 0.0879**** 0.0636
0.95 2.81 1.38
Intercept -0.0301 -0.0824*** -0.0858
-0.65 -2.22 -1.39
# of observations 39 39 39
R-squared 0.268 0.483 0.451
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.404 0.371
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are consistent with the asymmetric information theory, as the underpriced IPOs in our 
sample outperform the overpriced IPOs. In section 7.3 we found the underpricing on the P/E 
multiple to be 9 % and significantly different from zero on a 90 % level. As earlier 
mentioned, Kim & Ritter (1999) suggest that the coefficients for the first day should 
“approximately equal” the mispricing on the valuation multiple with the opposite sign. Our 
coefficient for the first day of -6.1 % is smaller in magnitude than the mispricing, indicating 
that not all mispricing is eliminated the first day, i.e. some degree of inefficiency in the 
markets. This result is in line with Ellul & Pagano (2003) who suggests that some 
asymmetric information persists after listing, and hence the market requires more than one 
day to the eliminate mispricing. This proposition is further strengthened by the fact that the 
magnitude of the coefficient increases to -13.2 % for the first month horizon. As this 
coefficient, on the other hand, is larger than the mispricing, it would be interesting to see if 
the coefficient with time converges towards the mispricing in the multiple, however, such a 
study will not be feasible with my data.  
The general findings regarding the peer pricing coefficient are consistent with the 
hypothesis, namely that the IPO companies priced low relative to peers will outperform the 
IPO companies priced high relative to peers. This was also indicated in Section 7.3, where 
we found the difference in performance of the two groupings to be significantly different 
from zero. In the regression analysis we were able to determine the ceteris paribus effect of 
peer pricing, which proved significant as well.  
AboveMidpoint 
We observe the effect of being priced high relative to the price range midpoint to be highly 
positive. The AboveMidpoint variable has a coefficient of 0.04 for the first day, indicating 
that an IPO company priced above midpoint ceteris paribus will outperform an IPO company 
priced below midpoint by 4.0 % the first day. The magnitude of the coefficient increases 
with the time horizon, in line with the overall deteriorating returns, with the coefficients 6.8 
% and 13.2 % for first week and first month, respectively. The coefficient is not significant 
for the first day, although significant on an 85 % and 95 % level for first week and first 
month, respectively.   
As discussed earlier, both Kim & Ritter (1999) and Bakke, et al. (2011) split the IPOs 
differently than I do. Consequently, their numbers are not directly comparable with mine. 
However, my findings are in line with their general results, namely that the IPOs priced high 
 60 
relative to the price range performs better in the aftermarket than the IPOs priced low 
relative to the range. Ellingsen (2012) and Samuelsen & Tveter (2006) use the same 
distinction as I do, and are therefore more comparable. Ellingsen found the coefficient for 
the AboveMidpoint variable to be 1.4 % and 1.5 % for first day and first week, respectively, 
compared to my results of 4.0 % on day 6.8 % for first day and first week. As her model 
does not include the same control variables as my model, her coefficients are not directly 
comparable either. Samuelsen & Tveter (2006) did not perform a regression analysis, and 
were therefore not able to determine the ceteris paribus effect. However, they performed an 
examination of the mean returns for IPOs priced above and below midpoint, similar to the 
introductory analysis I presented in section 7.2.1, and our results match. In general, the 
findings regarding the effect of where the price is set relative to the price range are consistent 
with the hypothesis, namely that the IPO companies priced high relative to the range 
outperform those priced low relative to the range.  
Control variables 
The dummy variable mBull, which controls for the market returns prior to the IPO, appears 
insignificant on all horizons. However, as the general market performance is frequently 
referred to when discussing the performance of IPOs, a control variable taking this aspect 
into account should be included. The coefficients make economic sense, as we observe 
market returns contributing positively, although insignificant. We observe only minor 
fluctuations in the magnitude of the coefficients across the different time horizons, with 2.2 
% for the first day and 3.1 % for the first month. This seems logical, as the market 
performance prior to listing should affect the initial returns positively, however, it should not 
have any additional impact on the longer horizons. It is more likely that the current market 
conditions after listing will affect the returns for the longer horizons.  
The dummy variable HighVol20, which controls for the market volatility prior to the IPO, 
has a coefficient of -0.025 for the first day, which indicates that IPOs going public in high-
volatility markets ceteris paribus will underperform IPOs going public in low-volatility 
markets by 2.5 % the first day. The coefficient is approximately the same for the first month, 
and in accordance with the flat coefficients for mBull across the horizons, this makes 
intuitive sense. The volatility before listing should not affect the returns beyond the initial 
returns. For first day and first month the coefficients are not significant. However, for the 
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first week we observe a substantially increased magnitude and significance. I will return to 
this puzzling finding shortly, when I interpret the coefficient of the size control variable. 
The dummy variable EVsize1000, which controls for the size of the IPO company, has a 
positive coefficient for the first day of 0.0378. This indicates that IPOs of large companies 
outperform IPOs of small companies by 3.78 % the first day, ceteris paribus, although the 
effect came out insignificant. This contradicts the findings of Yong (2011), who found small 
companies to significantly outperform the larger companies. In the analysis in section 7.4.3, 
we found a negative correlation between size and peer pricing. As Yong does not include 
peer pricing in his model, his findings regarding the size effect will not be directly 
comparable. The size effect is insignificant for the first month horizon as well, while the 
coefficient for the first week horizon appears highly significant with a large magnitude. This 
resembles the findings for HighVol20, which also increase in significance and magnitude for 
the first week horizon. This seems odd, as the coefficients for this horizon run counter to the 
logical linkage between first day and first month. The spiking significance and magnitude of 
the control variables occurs simultaneously as the P/E variable turns insignificant and is 
reduced in magnitude. My hypothesis is that coincidences make the internal correlations 
between the variables change, and hence the size and volatility control variables extract 
magnitude and significance out of the P/E coefficient. This effect illustrates the danger of 
running econometric analysis based on a small sample, and becomes evident by examining 
the correlation table presented earlier in Table 7-16. We observe the positive correlation 
between size and abnormal returns spiking for week, at the same time as the correlation for 
volatility with regards to abnormal returns triples. Although we see some fluctuations in the 
correlations for all variables, these stand out as particularly significant. Hence, the results for 
the first week should be interpreted with caution, and we should not put too much emphasis 
into the findings for this time horizon.  
Although the EVsize1000 variable does not prove significant on all horizons, the control 
variable on size has a very important function in the model. We found the larger companies 
to be priced relatively lower on P/E, and the P/E variable to correlate negatively with the 
returns. Thus, omitting the control variable on size would make the P/E variable look 
substantially more significant and larger in magnitude. This becomes very evident when we 
run the regressions while excluding EVsize1000 (regression output can be found in 
Appendix 10.8.5). The coefficients associated with the P/E variable substantially increase in 
both significance and magnitude for all time horizons. In addition, the explanatory power of 
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the model is reduced. The control variable on size is therefore absolutely necessary to avoid 
omitted variable bias.  
It is important to note that the significance figures from the regression output are regarding 
the individual significance. Particularly for the control variables in a regression like this, the 
joint significance should be in focus. This can be tested through an F-test, which tests the 
probability that all coefficients of the control variables would equal zero. A description of 
the technicalities of the test can be found in Appendix 10.7. Hence, it is no longer relevant 
which variables that prove significant, but rather the broad set of variables. If we run the F-
test for the control variables in the first week regression we obtain a test observator of 5.44, 
corresponding to a probability that all coefficients will equal zero of 0.4 %, i.e. the test 
proves a high joint significance (test output can be found in Appendix 10.8.6). Although the 
F-test reveals high joint significance for first week, it proves insignificance for first day and 
first month. However, we know that including an additional variable will not cause any bias 
(for day and month), but excluding it may cause omitted variable bias (for week). Since we 
need common comparable ground for all horizons, the full set needs to be included on all 
horizons.  
Intercept 
The intercept is the expected abnormal returns for the IPOs with all dummy variables 
equalling zero, i.e. a small, underpriced (relative to peers) company, priced below midpoint 
in the price range, going public in low-volatility, although, bear markets. We have a 
coefficient for first day of -0.03, indicating that a company with these characteristics may 
expect negative abnormal returns of -3 % the first day. The coefficients for first week and 
first month are -0.082 and -0.086, respectively. The coefficients are significantly different 
from zero only for the week horizon. However, these characteristics only apply for one 
company in our sample. Hence, we know that the intercept is calculated with great 
uncertainty, and should therefore not be emphasized. 
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8. Limitations and further analysis 
The most obvious limitation of this analysis is the limited number of data points. The final 
data set for the regression analysis consists of 39 IPOs, which is on the small side to conduct 
an econometric analysis. Although most of the independent variables proved significant in 
the regression analysis, a low number of observations will make it challenging to draw any 
conclusions for a population. The downside of few observations became evident for the first 
week horizon, where deviations in the data resulted in somewhat inconsistent estimates 
relative to the first day and first month horizons.   
In addition, the limited number of observations put restrictions on the number of control 
variables I could include in the model. Regarding the relative peer pricing analysis there are 
some aspects that should be further investigated. Differences in profitability and growth can 
justify differences in relative peer pricing, and should hence be controlled for. In addition, 
institutional investors often invest for the long-run. Consequently, it could be helpful to 
include relative peer pricing multiples further ahead than twelve months. In addition, we 
apply the same valuation multiples for all industries, while we know that practitioners apply 
certain multiples for certain industries. In order to correctly reflect the relative valuation 
perception of investors, we should ideally apply the same multiples as practitioners. It could 
be possible, although very time consuming, to test which multiples give the best 
predictability and significance within each industry, and thus apply different multiples for 
different industries. 
Through the discussion in section 7.2.1 regarding the IPOs which were priced exactly at the 
lower limit, it became evident that variation in investor quality could affect both the 
aftermarket performance and the predictability of the variable related to where the final offer 
price was set relative to the price range. If one could control for the investor quality directly, 
it would help eliminate potential bias in the AboveMidpoint variable. This could only be 
achievable through access to the book data from the investment bank taking the companies 
public. As described in the theory section, investment banks differentiate the investors into 
different tiering levels with regards to preferential interest in the allocation process. If one 
could obtain the average tiering level for the investors who received allocation in the IPOs, 
one could investigate the direct effect of variations in investor quality.  
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The only control variable regarding size in this analysis is linked to the enterprise value of 
the company. One additional size aspect that could be of interest is the size of the issue 
relative to the pre-issue equity value. A large issue causes a large supply of shares, which 
further would require high initial demand to achieve a high price in the offering. Also, the 
IPO is often utilized by current shareholders to sell shares. A large amount of sale shares will 
increase the supply of shares, which in the same way as for the issue size would require 
increased demand to maintain a high final price. In addition, large divestments by insiders 
may signal lower future earnings expectations, and may therefore possibly lead to a reduced 
demand.  
Regarding the market conditions, it could be interesting to investigate the effect of long-term 
market conditions in addition to the short period of three months. It is reasonable to assume 
that if bearish markets persist over the long term, the investment bankers may revise down 
the indicative price range to make the issue sell. As a result, the final price may not end up 
low relative to the range, even though the IPO is priced low on other measures.  
As becomes evident from this discussion, there are several aspects of this analysis that have 
room for improvement. Limitations with regards to time and available data have prevented 
me from performing a more thorough analysis for now. The main obstacle to be able to 
improve the analysis will be to obtain a larger data set, eliminating the restrictions with 
regards to the number of control variables one can include in the model.  
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9. Conclusion 
In this thesis I have examined the Norwegian IPO market for the period after the financial 
crisis. I found the average abnormal returns for the IPOs in the years 2009-2014 to be 
negative for first day, week and month, and the returns aggravated with the time horizon. 
This apparent overpricing in the Norwegian issue market contradicts all prior research on 
IPO pricing, as fundamental underpricing of IPOs has been a well established phenomenon 
and rationalised on theoretical grounds. Based on the same rationalisation of underpricing, 
the poor performance of Norwegian IPOs may impose severe challenges for companies 
seeking to go public in the years to come. If the investors feel they are not sufficiently 
compensated for bearing the risk of subscribing to IPOs, the advisors of companies going 
through the IPO process may struggle to obtain full subscription at acceptable terms.  
Although the average abnormal returns came out negative, the performance of the newly 
listed stocks proved to be surprisingly predictable. Related to the first hypothesis, I 
investigated how the initial demand for the issue affected the aftermarket performance. I 
proposed that offerings with high initial demand should outperform the offerings with low 
initial demand. The first proxy for demand was the placement of the final offer price relative 
to the indicative price range. The second proxy was the book coverage, i.e. how many times 
the issued shares were oversubscribed. In general the Norwegian IPOs appear heavily 
skewed towards the left of the price range midpoint, which stands out relative to 
international studies. The absolute level of oversubscription at the final offer price also came 
out lower than for other countries. Consistent with the hypothesis, both proxies confirmed a 
strong and positive relationship between the initial demand and the aftermarket performance. 
Related to the second hypothesis, I examined the pricing of IPOs relative to peers, and its 
impact on the aftermarket performance. I suggested that the cheaper the IPO is priced 
relative to listed comparable companies, the higher are the abnormal returns. Consistent with 
the hypothesis, IPOs which were underpriced relative to peers significantly outperformed the 
IPOs which were overpriced relative to peers. Based on the valuation multiples P/E and 
EV/EBITDA I found a significant underpricing of IPO companies relative to listed 
comparable companies. This contradicts prior research, which has found overpricing of IPO 
companies relative to listed peers. The coefficient related to the peer pricing variable for the 
first day did not fully reflect the underpricing on the valuation multiple. This indicates that 
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the markets require more than one day to eliminate mispricing, i.e. partial inefficiency in the 
equity markets.  
A remarkably large share of the IPOs was priced exactly at the lower limit of the range, 
although there is no theoretical reason for why this price should be more frequently observed 
than others. Contrary to the assumption regarding initial demand and pricing relative to the 
range, the IPOs priced at the lower limit significantly underperformed the IPOs priced below 
the range. The high share of IPOs priced at the lower limit may indicate that the investment 
bankers are reluctant of lowering the price below the range, and hence may accept bids from 
investors of lower quality than what they could have attained at a lower price. As low 
investor quality is assumed to negatively affect the aftermarket performance, one may 
suggest that the IPOs priced at the lower limit simply are not worthy their price, and ideally 
should have been priced lower. 
The first day returns proved to be a solid indicator of the performance for the two longer 
time horizons first week and first month. Out of the 29 IPOs with negative returns the first 
day, 24 continued declining the first month. The predictability was somewhat more 
ambiguous for the IPOs with positive returns the first day, most likely due to stabilization 
measures through the green shoe option included in some of the IPOs.   
I controlled for general market returns, market volatility and the size of the IPO company in 
my model. Large size and positive market returns positively affected the aftermarket 
performance, while high volatility negatively affected the aftermarket performance. 
Common for both market returns and volatility is that their effect beyond the first day returns 
was neglectable. The complete set of control variables proved highly joint significant, hence 
limiting the potential omitted variable bias in the model and enhancing the inference of the 
model.  
Although the sample size is on the small side for an econometric analysis, we obtain 
significant results for the variables of interest. However, in order to draw any conclusions for 
a population regarding the subjects investigated in this thesis, one should conduct a similar 
analysis on a larger sample. Nevertheless, this analysis should provide the reader insight into 
the general characteristics of the Norwegian IPO market and the relationship between initial 
demand, relative pricing and aftermarket performance. 
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10. Appendix 
10.1 Abnormal returns - Differences between countries 
Table 10-1: Equally weighted average initial returns for 52 countries 
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10.2 Assumptions for the OLS model 
As described in section 4.7.2, there are a few key assumptions that need to be fulfilled for the 
OLS-model to provide unbiased estimators for the population parameters. The first five 
assumptions constitute the Gauss-Markov theorem, and given that these assumptions hold, 
the OLS estimators will be the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) of the population 
parameters.  
Assumption 1: The population is linear in parameters 
The population has to be linear in parameters, meaning that each independent variable has a 
linear variation with the dependent variable (the ceteris paribus effect).  
Assumption 2: The sample size must be random 
The sample must be randomly selected, with n [(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖): 𝑖 = 1,2 … 𝑛], where each unity of 
the population has the same probability of being in the sample. For cross-sectional data, this 
is often reasonable to assume.  
Assumption 3: The outcomes of the independent variables are not all the same value 
None of the independent variables can be constant, as this would incapacitate to determine 
how the changes in the independent variable would affect the dependent variable. There can 
be no exact linear relationships among the independent variables (i.e. no perfect 
collinearity).  
Assumption 4: Zero conditional mean 
The expected value of the error term has to be zero given any values of the independent 
variables, i.e. 𝐸(𝑢|𝑥) = 0. This means that the error term is independent of the x, which is 
crucial to be able to determine the ceteris paribus of a change in the independent variable.  
Assumption 5: Homoscedasticity 
The variance of the error term u has to the same regardless of the value of the independent 
variable. Mathematically, this may be stated as:  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢|𝑥𝑖) = 𝜎
2, 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦|𝑥𝑖) = 𝜎
2 
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Although the five assumptions above are sufficient in order to obtain the best linear unbiased 
estimators (BLUE) of the population parameters, one additional assumption is required in 
order to be able to draw inference of the model.  
Assumption 6: The error term is independently and identically distributed 
The error term of the population must be independent of the explanatory variables and 
normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎2.  
𝑢~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝜎2) 
𝑢~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝜎2) 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ?̂?𝑗
̂ ~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝛽𝑗, 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̂?𝑗
̂ )) 
In other words, the error term must be independently and identically distributed (often 
referred to as i.i.d.). This last assumption is stronger than the fourth and fifth assumption 
combined, because it also requires normal distribution. (Wooldridge, 2012) 
10.3 Interpretation of estimated slope parametres 
As earlier described, the first assumption requires the population model to be linear in 
parameters. However, assuming a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables is not as restrictive as it might seem. Many non-linearities can be 
incorporated into the model by redefining the variables. Combinations of logarithmic and 
level variables can deal with nonlinearities that otherwise would make the estimation of the 
model useless for predication. The redefinitions of the variables will not affect the mechanics 
in the estimation, however, it will affect the size and interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients.  
The level-level model: 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 + 𝑢, 
where a ceteris paribus change in x (keeping all other constant) gives:  
∆𝑦 = 𝛽1∆𝑥, 
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i.e. a one unit change in the independent variable gives a 𝛽1change in the dependent variable 
y. The level-level model will be sufficient if the relationship between the dependent variable 
and the independent variable initially is linear and hence no modification will be necessary 
to fulfil the first assumption.  
The log-level model:  
ln (𝑦) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 + 𝑢, 
where a ceteris paribus change in x gives: 
%∆𝑦 = 100𝛽1∆𝑥 
i.e. a one unit change in x gives a (100𝛽1) % change in y.  
The log-log model:  
ln (𝑦) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝑥) + 𝑢 
where a ceteris paribus change in x gives:  
%∆𝑦 = 𝛽1 %∆𝑥 
i.e. a one % change in x gives a 𝛽1 % change in y. This means that 𝛽1 is the elasticity of y 
with respect to x.  
The level-log model:  
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝑥) + 𝑢 
where a ceteris paribus change in x gives:  
∆𝑦 =
𝛽1
100
 %∆𝑥 
i.e. a one % change in x increases y with 
𝛽1
100
. (Balsvik, 2013) 
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10.4 T-test for two populations with different variance 
I concluded that the normal distribution was a fair assumption for the returns in my sample. 
Hence I can apply a t-test two determine whether there is a significant difference between 
the two populations. The test statistic 
𝑇 =
(?̅?1 − ?̅?2) − (𝜇1 − 𝜇2)
√
𝑆1
2
𝑛1
+
𝑆2
2
𝑛2
 
is approximately t-distributed with  
𝑣 =
(
𝑆1
2
𝑛1
+
𝑆2
2
𝑛2
)2
(𝑆1
2/𝑛1)2
𝑛1 − 1
+
(𝑆2
2/𝑛2)2
𝑛2 − 1
 
degrees of freedom. If T exceeds the critical value with v degrees of freedom, one can reject 
the null hypothesis. The critical value will depend on both the significance level applied, and 
the degrees of freedom. The critical values may be found in a distribution table (not attached 
in this document). (Møen, 2012) 
 
10.5 Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) Sum Rank Test 
To test whether the relative peer pricing significantly differs from 1, I use the distribution-
free two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test. Then I can test the null hypothesis 
that to samples are the same against the alternative hypothesis that they differ. The test is 
more efficient than the standard t-test for distributions that prove non-normal. This is the 
case for the relative pricing in my sample, which proved to be heavily skewed towards the 
left. The test ranks the observations in the two samples, and the test statistic W is the smallest 
rank sum of the two samples. For sufficiently large samples the test-statistic is 
approximately normal N(𝜇, 𝜎), with  
𝜇 =
𝑛1(𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 1)
2
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 and  
𝜎2 =
𝑛1 ∗ 𝑛2(𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 1)
12
 
With a large sample (assumed to be larger than 20), we can perform a standard z-test with 
𝑧 =
𝑊 − 𝜇
𝜎
 
where we can reject the null hypothesis if the test statistic exceeds the critical value. In the 
case of a large n (assumed to be more than 20) it is indifferent whether we use the smallest 
or largest rank sum when calculating the test statistic. As the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Rank 
Sum Test is created to test difference between two samples I simply create a sample of n 
observations with the pricing value 1. Then I further test whether the relative pricing based 
on P/E and EV/EBITDA significantly differs from this constructed sample. (Møen, 2012) 
 74 
10.6 List of variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name Description
DayAbnRet/WeekAbnRet/MonthAbnRet
Dependent variables. Abnormal return of the newly listed stock after first 
day/week/month. Calculated with OSEBX as reference index
HigherPE &  HigherEvEbitda
Dummy variables regarding the the relative peer pricing, with P/E and 
EV/EBITDA. The variables will have the value 1 if the company is 
overpriced relative to peers, and correspondingly have the value 0 if the 
company is underpriced relative to peers
AboveMidpoint
Dummy variable regarding the pricing relative to the price range midpoint. 
The variable will have the value 1 if the company has a final offer price at or 
above the price range midpoint, correspondingly the value 0 if the company 
has a final offer price below the price range midpoint
mBull
Dummy variable regarding the general market performance. The variable will 
have the value 1 if the reference index OSEBX has a positive return the three 
months prior to listing, correspondingly the value 0 if negative returns
HighVol20
Dummy variable regarding the volatility in the market. The variable will have 
the value 1 if the reference volatility index VIX has an average value above 
20 the three months prior to listing, correspondingly the value 0 if the average 
volatility index value is below 20
EVsize1000
Dummy variable regarding the company size. The variable will have the value 
1 if the company has an enterprise value above NOK 1,000 million, 
correspondingly the value 0 if the company has an enterprise value below 
NOK 1,000 million
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10.7 F-test of joint significance 
If we want to test a hypothesis involving more than one coefficient it requires a different test 
statistic and null distribution. For this purpose we may apply the F-test, which simply tests if 
all slopes of the coefficients of interest are zero. The null hypothesis will then be: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 
and 𝛽2 = 0 
and 𝛽3 = 0 
The test statistic F would be calculated as 
𝐹0 =
(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑟 − 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑢𝑟)/𝑞
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑢𝑟/(𝑛 − (𝑘 + 1))
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑟 is the sum of the squared residuals of the restricted model and 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑢𝑟 is the sum 
of squared residuals of the unrestricted model. n is the number of observations, k is the 
number of independent variables in the unrestricted model and q is the number of restrictions 
(i.e. the number of coefficients being tested). The critical value of an F-test is 
disproportionally complex to state mathematically and should be obtained through statistical 
software. (Blackwell, 2008) 
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10.8  Regression output 
10.8.1 Correlation overview  
 
10.8.2 Regression with both peer pricing variables 
 1st day 1st week 1t month 
HigherPE -0.0530 -0.0290 -0.0949
**
 
 (0.0390) (0.0262) (0.0512) 
    
HigherEvEbitda -0.0120 -0.0211 -0.0536 
 (0.0351) (0.0238) (0.0449) 
    
AboveMidpoint 0.0396 0.0672
*
 0.129
***
 
 (0.0312) (0.0446) (0.0554) 
    
mBull 0.0234 0.0306 0.0366 
 (0.0282) (0.0298) (0.0463) 
    
HighVol20 -0.0238 -0.0748
***
 -0.0242 
 (0.0391) (0.0276) (0.0469) 
    
EVsize1000 0.0388 0.0896
****
 0.0679
*
 
 (0.0395) (0.0319) (0.0449) 
    
_cons -0.0298 -0.0819
***
 -0.0845 
 (0.0471) (0.0370) (0.0612) 
adj. R
2
 0.133 0.393 0.372 
N 39 39 39 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.15, 
**
 p < 0.1, 
***
 p < 0.05, 
****
 p < 0.01 
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10.8.3 Final regression with P/E variable  
 1st day 1st week 1t month 
HigherPE -0.0612
**
 -0.0434
*
 -0.132
****
 
 (0.0332) (0.0280) (0.0466) 
    
AboveMidpoint 0.0402 0.0683
*
 0.132
***
 
 (0.0301) (0.0441) (0.0552) 
    
mBull 0.0221 0.0283 0.0307 
 (0.0269) (0.0291) (0.0452) 
    
HighVol20 -0.0246 -0.0762
****
 -0.0279 
 (0.0372) (0.0269) (0.0457) 
    
EVsize1000 0.0378 0.0879
****
 0.0636 
 (0.0399) (0.0313) (0.0462) 
    
_cons -0.0301 -0.0824
***
 -0.0858 
 (0.0466) (0.0371) (0.0617) 
adj. R
2
 0.156 0.404 0.371 
N 39 39 39 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.15, 
**
 p < 0.1, 
***
 p < 0.05, 
****
 p < 0.01 
10.8.4 Regression with EV/EBITDA variable 
 1st day 1st week 1t month 
HigherEvEbitda -0.0423 -0.0377 -0.108
***
 
 (0.0310) (0.0259) (0.0433) 
    
AboveMidpoint 0.0323 0.0632 0.116
***
 
 (0.0310) (0.0440) (0.0536) 
    
mBull 0.0369
*
 0.0379 0.0608
*
 
 (0.0223) (0.0260) (0.0387) 
    
HighVol20 -0.0241 -0.0749
***
 -0.0247 
 (0.0412) (0.0279) (0.0509) 
    
EVsize1000 0.0544 0.0982
****
 0.0959
***
 
 (0.0379) (0.0306) (0.0443) 
    
_cons -0.0552 -0.0958
****
 -0.130
***
 
 (0.0385) (0.0303) (0.0503) 
adj. R
2
 0.112 0.400 0.337 
N 39 39 39 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.15, 
**
 p < 0.1, 
***
 p < 0.05, 
****
 p < 0.01 
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10.8.5 Final regression without control variable on size 
 1st day 1st week 1t month 
HigherPE -0.0753
***
 -0.0761
***
 -0.155
****
 
 (0.0287) (0.0315) (0.0419) 
    
AboveMidpoint 0.0506
*
 0.0924
***
 0.149
***
 
 (0.0310) (0.0417) (0.0556) 
    
mBull 0.00897 -0.00226 0.00862 
 (0.0286) (0.0337) (0.0470) 
    
HighVol20 -0.0204 -0.0664
***
 -0.0208 
 (0.0337) (0.0298) (0.0427) 
    
_cons 0.00398 -0.00309 -0.0284 
 (0.0291) (0.0331) (0.0487) 
adj. R
2
 0.146 0.274 0.354 
N 39 39 39 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.15, 
**
 p < 0.1, 
***
 p < 0.05, 
****
 p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
10.8.6 F-test of joint significance of control variables (first week) 
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